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Introduction
The labor market is a central institution in any modern economy. This market allocates
workers to jobs. If the labor market operates properly, workers will ﬁnd employment at
the right speed, and these jobs will be appropriate to their experience and skill. If the
market does not function satisfactorily, willing workers will remain unemployed for too long,
vacancies will stay unﬁlled, and many workers will occupy positions that are unsuited for
them. Moreover, ﬁrms will not appear, grow, or close at the optimal rate.
At the same time, the labor market is characterized by pervasive regulation. Across
nations, the labor market is subject to minimum wages, hiring and ﬁring restrictions,
compulsory collective bargaining and arbitrage, limitations on the number of hours, anti-
discrimination clauses, curtailments on work by age and by gender, etc. Moreover, substan-
tial diﬀerences in labor market ﬂexibility persist even within groups of countries with similar
income levels.
A recent and growing literature investigates the consequences of such heterogeneity in
labor market institutions, studying how labor market rigidities aﬀect the causes and conse-
quences of policy changes, such as trade liberalization and market reforms. An important
conclusion of these research is that the institutional features of local labor markets shape
the pattern of comparative advantage across countries, contributing to the determination
of long-run outcomes of regime changes. Thus far, however, few works have addressed the
implications of labor market rigidities for trade-induced labor dynamics focusing on the infor-
mal sector, or the second moment shocks in an open economy setting. Important questions
remain open for researchers and policymakers: How does labor market frictions interact
with uncertainty in a small open economy? How do labor market frictions in formal and
informal sectors aﬀect the transition dynamics generated by trade integration? Are labor
market frictions important for understanding the propagation of uncertainty shocks across
countries? The purpose of this thesis is to address these questions, studying the role of labor
market frictions and its interaction with international trade and uncertainty.
Chapter One The ﬁrst chapter investigates the impact of uncertainty shocks in a small
open economy with search and matching frictions and ﬁrm entry. Other existing works
analyze the macroeconomic eﬀect of uncertainty shocks using either search and matching
models, or in an open economy setting. To the best of our knowledge, none has used ﬁrm
entry model. In our paper, we combine all elements and show how they interact and magnify
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recessionary eﬀects of uncertainty shocks.
We ﬁrst develop our empirical analysis in the context of the Korean economy, as all
dimensions of the model are relevant in this country. An increase in uncertainty lowers
output, consumption, investment and job ﬁnding rate, while raising unemployment and
job separations. We also supplement the existing empirical evidence by looking at ﬁrm
dynamics, real exchange rate and current account behavior. Increased uncertainty generates
current account surplus, real exchange rate depreciation and reduces the number of ﬁrms
in the economy. In our theoretical framework, we illustrate new transmissions mechanism
that are ignored in the literature. Economic mechanisms go beyond the simple addition of
each feature. Search frictions, ﬁrm entry and the open economy dimension actually strongly
interact to amplify the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks and make the model consistent with the
empirical evidence.
This paper is co-authored with Thepthida Sopreseuth (Université de Cergy-Pontoise
(THEMA)). We thank Olivier Charlot, Lise Patureau, Lee Sang Seok and Cristina Terra
for their comments as well as participants to T2M conference (Lisbon, 2017), Asian Meeting
of the Econometric Society (Hong Kong, 2017), Society for Computational Economics (New
York, 2017), KEA-APEA conference (Seoul, 2017).
Chapter Two The second chapter studies how tax reforms help ensure a fair globaliza-
tion. Over the past decades, trade liberalization has led to signiﬁcant trade expansion, with
positive eﬀects on the economic activity. However, trade liberalization has not always been
associated with better working conditions and more equal income distribution. In this paper
we develop a two-area model: a developed and an emerging country. The two areas diﬀer
according to the size of the informal sector, which is characterized by a more ﬂexible labor
market (i.e. rapid entry and exit and more ﬂexible adjustment to change in demand) and
lower productivity. Our analysis suggests that trade liberalization boosts economic activity
and employment in both the formal and informal sector. However, this employment expan-
sion is biased toward the informal sector, which is not subject to labor regulation and hence
more ﬂexible. Hence, trade liberalization leads to lower employment quality, as informal
workers are not covered by the labor legislation (e.g. minimum wages) and social security,
and receive lower wage.
In order to reduce the increasing incidence of informality by trade liberalization, both
countries should introduce incentives to develop businesses in the formal economy. A budget-
neutral tax reform switching the tax burden from payroll taxes paid by ﬁrms operating in the
formal sector to a consumption tax may represent a strategy to support the formal sector.
Moreover, these tax reforms succeed in mitigating the adverse eﬀects of trade liberalization on
employment quality. However, formalization comes at the cost of widening income inequality
between formal and informal workers.
This paper is co-authored with François Langot (Le Mans University (Gains-TEPP
& IRA), Paris School of Economics & Cepremap) and Rossana Merola (ILO). The work
greatly beneﬁted from guidance, encouragement and helpful comments by Stéphane Ad-
jemian, Thomas Brand, Matteo Cacciatore, Ekkehard Ernst, Fabio Ghironi, Stefan Kühn,
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Pierella Paci, Christian Viegelahn and members of the DYNARE team. It has been pre-
sented at the World Bank (2018) and Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Seoul,
2018).
Chapter Three The third chapter assesses the importance of labor market institutions in
the transmission of uncertainty shocks to labor markets. Since the work by Bloom (2009),
uncertainty about the future course of the economy has been identiﬁed as a possible driving
force behind business cycle ﬂuctuations. A number of recent papers have shown that an in-
crease in uncertainty leads to a drop in economic activity: output, investment, consumption,
and employment. However, most of the analysis studies the impact of uncertainty shocks
in single-country analysis and cross-country evidence focusing on the labor market is still
scarce.
Using country-speciﬁc VARs across OECD countries, I ﬁnd that there is substantial
cross-country heterogeneity in the responses of unemployment rates to uncertainty shocks.
I also provide evidence that this heterogeneity can be attributed to diﬀerential employment
protection legislation (EPL). Low EPL countries suﬀer more severe rises in unemployment
compared to high EPL countries following uncertainty shocks. Stricter EPL mutes the re-
action of unemployment, making it more costly to lay workers oﬀ. Moreover, the second
moment shock reinforces this mechanism through the real options channel. Under irre-
versibility and uncertainty, ﬁring costs come with a bigger cost. On the other hand, the role
of other labor market characteristics is ambiguous.
3
Chapter 1
Firm Entry, Search and Marching
Frictions in a Small Open Economy
Faced with Uncertainty Shocks: The
Case of Korea
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1.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of uncertainty shocks in a small open economy with
search and matching frictions, endogenous job separation and ﬁrm entry. We combine these
elements to highlight important transmission mechanisms that have not been analyzed in
the existing work. We develop our analysis in the context of the Korean economy, as all
dimensions of the model are relevant in this country: Korea is a globalized economy with
heavily regulated labor and product markets, in which the job separation margin explains a
large share of unemployment ﬂuctuations.
We ﬁrst provide original empirical evidence on the eﬀects of ﬂuctuating uncertainty on
macroeconomic aggregates, labor market adjustments, ﬁrm dynamics, real exchange rate and
current account. Using survey data, we compute the job ﬁnding and job separation rates.
Following Shimer (2012)'s variance decomposition, unemployment inﬂows appears to be the
main driver of unemployment cyclical behavior, which stresses the need for endogenous
separation in the model. We then investigate the macroeconomic impact of time-varying
volatility in a structural VAR. In doing so, we extend the literature along several dimensions.
First, to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to provide empirical evidence on labor market
ﬂows, ﬁrm dynamics and open-economy variables. Previous studies either investigate labor
market ﬂows or open-economy dimension. None look at ﬁrm dynamics. We look at all
dimensions in Korean data. Secondly, the papers that analyze the eﬀect of uncertainty shocks
on the labor market (Leduc & Liu (2016), Guglielminetti (2016), Riegler (2015)) focus on
US data. However, gross labor market ﬂows are large in the US, suggesting that search and
matching frictions may be too low to create large irreversibility. The macroeconomic eﬀects
of uncertainty may be larger in more regulated labor and product markets, such as in Korea.
With the exception of Miyamoto (2016) on Japanese data, to our knowledge, there is no
empirical study on labor market ﬂows in other countries in uncertain times. We ﬁll this gap.
We ﬁnd that an increase in uncertainty lowers output, consumption, investment and job
ﬁnding rates, while raising job separations and unemployment. We also ﬁnd that increased
uncertainty generates current account surplus, real exchange rate depreciation and reduces
the number of ﬁrms in the economy.
We next develop a small open economy with search and matching frictions, endogenous
job separation and ﬁrm entry. Uncertainty shocks are deﬁned as unexpected exogenous vari-
ations in the volatility of the technological process. We consider only this uncertainty shock
in order to compare our results to the literature (that mainly focuses on the macroeconomic
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impact of this shock). The model predicts that an increase in uncertainty raises unemploy-
ment, job separation rates, and lowers output, consumption, investment, the number of ﬁrms
and job ﬁnding rates. The economy is also characterized by a current account surplus and
real exchange rate depreciation. These eﬀects are consistent with the VAR evidence.
The economic mechanisms are the following. In the standard real business cycle (RBC)
model, uncertainty creates a precautionary saving motive: Domestic households cut con-
sumption spending to invest in physical capital, job creation, ﬁrm entry or Foreign bonds.
In a search and matching model, a job match is an irreversible long-term employment rela-
tion, which creates an option-value channel. When uncertainty increases, the value of a job
match declines as the option value of waiting increases. Under the benchmark calibration,
the option-value channel dominates the precautionary motive eﬀects such that the increase
in uncertainty reduces vacancies. Firms also use the separation margin to lay oﬀ the least
productive workers. Unemployment goes up, making it harder for unemployed workers to
ﬁnd jobs. The decline in employment drives the marginal product of capital downward,
which triggers fall in capital investment. The real option channel also applies to ﬁrm entry.
As ﬁrm entry is costly, the option value of waiting increases. The expected value of a ﬁrm
falls, which drives ﬁrm entry down. The number of producers declines. At the aggregate
level, the reduction in the number of ﬁrms is equivalent to a drop in the capital stock. This
ampliﬁes the initial fall in output. The recessionary eﬀects of increased uncertainty make
investment in capital, job creation and ﬁrms unattractive. Households are then attracted by
foreign bonds, which creates a current account surplus. Real exchange rate depreciates in
response to increased uncertainty because of the fall in domestic relative prices, induced by
the reduction in the number of producers. Real exchange rate depreciation makes Foreign
bonds attractive as an hedging device against domestic shocks.
Economic mechanisms go beyond the simple addition of each feature. Search frictions,
ﬁrm entry and the open economy dimension actually strongly interact to amplify the eﬀects
of uncertainty shocks and make the model consistent with the empirical evidence. Several
elements illustrate these interactions. First, in a search and matching model with ﬁrm entry,
ﬁrm entry interacts with labor frictions as the number of competitors aﬀect the ﬁrm's relative
price, hence the marginal value of a match. In turn, as ﬁrm entry involves vacancy opening,
labor market tightness aﬀects ﬁrm entry costs (Cacciatore & Fiori (2016)). Secondly, ﬁrm
entry aﬀects relative prices, hence consumer price index. The real exchange rate is therefore
responsive to changes in the competitive environment. Furthermore, real exchange rate
depreciation makes Foreign bonds attractive as an insurance device against domestic shocks.
6
Households then strongly reduce consumption and investment in domestic smoothing tools
(jobs, ﬁrms or capital), thereby amplifying the recession in uncertain times.
Our work relates to the literature that documents the relationship between uncertainty
and the business cycle. Basu & Bundick (2017) argue that the fall in output, consumption,
investment, and employment can be obtained after an uncertainty shock in a demand-driven
economy, with price rigidity. In Basu & Bundick (2017)'s model, increased uncertainty leads
to an endogenous rise in markups, which is crucial in driving down employment in uncertain
times. In this paper, as heightened uncertainty lowers ﬁrm entry, markups also endogenously
increase. With respect to Basu & Bundick (2017), we investigate the macroeconomic eﬀects
of uncertainty shocks on labor market ﬂows in an open economy setting. Other existing works
analyze the macroeconomic eﬀect of uncertainty shocks using either search and matching
models, or in an open economy setting. To the best of our knowledge, none has used ﬁrm
entry model. In our paper, we combine all elements and show how they interact and magnify
recessionary eﬀects of uncertainty shocks.
With respect to the literature on uncertainty shock in an open economy setting (Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2011), Fogli & Perri (2015), Kollmann (2016)), our originality lies in inves-
tigating the consequences of time-varying volatility on labor market adjustments and ﬁrm
entry. All models, including our own, correctly predict that heightened uncertainty is as-
sociated with a current account surplus. However, Kollmann (2016)'s model predicts that
heightened uncertainty leads to higher domestic consumption and real exchange rate appre-
ciation, which is not consistent with Korean data. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and
Fogli & Perri (2015)'s models generate a large precautionary savings that entices domestic
households to work more, which is also inconsistent with Korean data. With respect to
the literature in a search and matching environment (Leduc & Liu (2016), Guglielminetti
(2016), Miyamoto (2016)), we lay stress on the endogenous separation and study the inter-
action between search and matching frictions and ﬁrm entry in an open economy setting. In
particular, with endogenous separation, job ﬁnding rate increases in uncertain times, which
is not consistent with the data (Miyamoto (2016)). Schaal (2017)'s search model also pre-
dicts an increase in the job ﬁnding rate during the Great recession 1. Riegler (2015)'s search
and matching model correctly predicts a fall in the job ﬁnding rate in response to increased
uncertainty. With respect to his paper, we investigate the impact of uncertainty in aggregate
shocks, rather than idiosyncratic volatility shock. Furthermore, Riegler (2015) introduces
1Schaal (2017) also get sizable eﬀects from idiosyncratic volatility shocks partly by assuming a negative
correlation between the volatility shocks and the level of aggregate productivity. We do not follow this route.
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costly job creation (in addition to the usual hiring cost) to obtain the desired fall in job
ﬁnding rate after an increase in uncertainty. We do not follow this route. Finally, we take
into account the feedback eﬀect of ﬁrm dynamics on relative prices, hence real exchange
rate, which in turn aﬀects precautionary motives and investment. Schaal (2017) and Riegler
(2015) propose interesting insight in labor market dynamics. However, they say nothing
about consumption and investment dynamics. As pointed out by Basu & Bundick (2017),
papers experience diﬃculty in generating business-cycle comovements among output, con-
sumption, investment, and employment from changes in uncertainty. Our paper succeeds
in doing so, in addition to generating data-consistent a fall in the number of ﬁrms, current
account surplus and real exchange rate depreciation. Finally, we relate to the literature
using search and matching models with ﬁrm dynamics. Cacciatore & Fiori (2016) and Cac-
ciatore et al. (2016) focus on structural reforms. We extend this work by investigating the
macroeconomic eﬀects of uncertainty shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. We investigate the macroeconomic eﬀects of uncer-
tainty shocks in Korean data in Section 2. We develop a small open economy model with
search and matching, endogenous separation and ﬁrm entry in Section 3. We explore the
macroeconomic eﬀects of uncertainty shocks in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Eﬀects of uncertainty shocks: empirical evidence
1.2.1 Measuring uncertainty
Our measure of uncertainty is forecast dispersion computed from the Korean economy fore-
casts. Periods when forecasters hold more diverse opinions are likely to reﬂect greater un-
certainty. Survey-based measures of uncertainty have been commonly used in the empiri-
cal literature (Bachmann et al. (2013), Leduc & Liu (2016), Guglielminetti (2016) among
others). Since January 1995, Consensus Economics has surveyed over prominent ﬁnancial
and economic forecasters for their estimates of a range of Korean macroeconomic variables,
including GDP, inﬂation, unemployment and interest rates over a 2 year forecast horizon.
Among them, we use the cross-sectional standard deviation of GDP forecasts.2 The monthly
2To construct the series, we compute the average of cross-sectional standard deviations of GDP forecasts
over a 2 year horizon. Bloom (2014) also checks that forecast dispersion provides a good proxy for perceived
uncertainty. In the US Survey of Professional Forecasters, in 1992, forecasters provide probabilities for
GDP growth (in percent) falling into ten diﬀerent bins. Using the subjective uncertainty calculated using
these probabilities, Bloom shows that disagreement across forecasters indeed captures changes in subjective
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time series are seasonally adjusted using X-13-ARIMA-SEATS method and we quarterly av-
erage the series from 1995Q1 to 2015Q4.
Since we study the eﬀects of a domestic uncertainty shock, however, our measure needs
to be orthogonal to foreign uncertainty shocks. Therefore, we regress our forecast dispersion
on US uncertainty measure3 and use the residual from this regression as our uncertainty
measure. Figure 1.1 displays our measure of uncertainty. In particular, our measure is pos-
itively associated with the unemployment rate. This counter-cyclical behavior is consistent
with empirical ﬁndings on US data.
Figure 1.1: Uncertainty measure
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
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Uncertainty measure
Unemployment rate
Source: Authors's calculations and Statistics Korea. Uncertainty measure (the left y-axis). Unemployment
rate (the right y-axis)
1.2.2 Measuring worker ﬂows
As in Shimer (2012), we measure the probability that an employed worker becomes un-
employed and the probability that an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job, using EAPS survey
data, between 1995Q1 and 2015Q4 4. Job ﬁnding and employment exit probabilities are
uncertainty.
3As US uncertainty indicator, we use a measure of disagreement drawn by the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) administered by the Philadelphia FED. Professional forecasters are asked to disclose their
best predictions about several macroeconomics indicators at diﬀerent horizons. The Philadelphia FED itself
computes a measure of forecast dispersion, which consists of the diﬀerence between the 75th and the 25th
percentiles of the forecasts. We use this measure computed for the forecast on nominal GDP.
4See Appendix 1.5 for a full description of the microdata and the methodology.
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reported in Figure 1.6 in Appendix 1.5. The job ﬁnding probability falls in recession, while
employment exit probability rises in economic slumps. These cyclical features are also found
in other OECD countries (Elsby et al. (2008), Shimer (2012)). The salient stylized fact in
Korean data lies in the leading role of job separations in unemployment ﬂuctuations. Based
on Shimer (2012)'s variance decomposition, exit from employment accounts for nearly 80%
of unemployment ﬂuctuations (versus an upper bound of 50%-60% on US and French data
(Fujita & Ramey (2009), Hairault et al. (2015)).5 As a result, the model developed in this
paper includes endogenous separation.
1.2.3 VAR evidence
The structural VAR consists of six time-series; in the following order, a measure of uncer-
tainty, one of the labor market variables (the unemployment rate, the job ﬁnding rate or
the job separation rate), the number of ﬁrms 6, real GDP (or one of GDP components such
as real consumption or real private investment), a measure related to the open economy
dimension (current account, as percent of GDP, or real exchange rate deﬁned as the relative
price of US consumption basket with respect to the Korean one7) and US real GDP. We
include US output to ensure the identiﬁed shock is not correlated with any foreign shock. It
is estimated with 2 lags according to Akaike's information criterion. All quarterly variables
are in log (except a measure of uncertainty and current account), seasonally adjusted, and
HP-ﬁltered with smoothing parameter 1600. The sample ranges from 1995Q1 to 2015Q4.
As in Basu & Bundick (2017) and Leduc & Liu (2016), we assume that uncertainty does
not respond to the state of the economy on impact, but labor variables, real domestic GDP,
and current account are allowed to react instantaneously to uncertainty. As in Leduc & Liu
(2016), our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the fact that, when answering questions at time
t about their expectations, survey participants do not have complete information about the
time t realizations of variables in our VAR model because the macroeconomic data have
not yet been made public. Thus, the measure of uncertainty comes ﬁrst in the Cholesky
ordering.
Figure 1.2 plots the eﬀects of the relevant variables to one-standard deviation shock to
5See Appendix 1.5 for details on the computation of Shimer (2012)'s variance decomposition.
6Korean ﬁrm data are available on a semi-annual basis. Thus, semi-annual stock of ﬁrms is turned into
quarterly data using spline. Furthermore, for want of data, we could not include vacancies in the VAR.
7In the model as in the data, real exchange rate is the US CPI expressed in South Korean wons relative
to Korean CPI. An increase in the real exchange rate captures a depreciation of the Korean currency.
10
uncertainty with the 68% conﬁdence bands. The responses of all macroeconomic variables
appear statistically signiﬁcant. First of all, a surge in uncertainty reduces output, consump-
tion, and investment. Speciﬁcally, an increase in uncertainty produces a peak decline in
output of about 0.6 percent, which falls within the range found in the literature (0.2 per-
cent in Basu & Bundick (2017), 2.5 percent in Bloom et al. (2012)). The peak decline in
investment is twice larger as the decline in output, as in US data (Basu & Bundick (2017)).
Figure 1.2: Structual VAR : The eﬀects of one-standard deviation increase in uncertainty
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Note: Quarterly data. 68% conﬁdence band. The units of the horizontal axes are quarters. The units of
the vertical axes are % change. Example : following a 1 standard deviation shock, the maximum fall in
investment is -1.5%. Current account is % of GDP, IRF is then in percentage points.
Heightened uncertainty lowers GDP, consumption and investment, as well as the job
ﬁnding rate while job separation increases. Both eﬀects on the job ﬁnding and separation
rates contribute to an increase in unemployment. In particular, a one-standard-deviation
increase in uncertainty leads to a peak increase of unemployment rate of about 5.1 percent
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relative to the sample average. The negative eﬀects of higher uncertainty on labor variables
are in line with the recent empirical studies on US ﬂows (Leduc & Liu (2016), Riegler (2015)
and Guglielminetti (2016)). The number of ﬁrms signiﬁcantly drops following an uncertainty
shock. Increased uncertainty is also associated with current account surplus. This is con-
sistent with the empirical result that heightened uncertainty reduces domestic absorption
(consumption and investment fall, Fogli & Perri (2015), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011)).
Korean real exchange depreciates on impact. This is also consistent with current account
surplus as real depreciation makes imports more expensive and sustains exports. In Ap-
pendix 1.5, we also show that the results are robust to alternative identiﬁcation, volatility
measure, and speciﬁcation.
1.3 Small open economy with labor market frictions, en-
dogenous job separation and ﬁrm entry
In this section, we develop a small open economy with labor market frictions, endogenous
job separation and ﬁrm entry as in Cacciatore & Fiori (2016) and Cacciatore et al. (2016).
Foreign variables are denoted with a superscript star. The subscript d refers to quantities
and prices of a country's own goods consumed domestically. x refers to quantities and prices
of exports.
1.3.1 Household's preference
The economy is populated by a unit mass of households, where each household is an extended
family. In each family, some members are employed, others are employed. This assumption is
made to avoid heterogeneity across households, as in Andolfatto (1996). The representative
household maximizes the expected intertemporal utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σct
1− σc
]
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and σc > 0 risk aversion. Ct represents consumption
of market and home-produced goods: Ct = CMt + (1 − Lt)hp, where CMt is consumption
of market goods, hp is home production, and Lt is the number of employed workers. The
aggregate market-consumption basket CMt is a CES aggregate of domestic (Cd,t) and foreign
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(C∗x,t) goods with elasticity of substitution φ > 0:
CMt =
(
(1− γ) 1φC
φ−1
φ
d,t + γ
1
φ (C∗x,t)
φ−1
φ
) φ
φ−1
with 0 < γ < 1 the share of foreign goods in the consumption basket and φ the elasticity of
substitution between Home and Foreign goods. The corresponding composite price index is:
Pt =
(
(1− γ)P 1−φd,t + γ(εtP ∗x,t)1−φ
) 1
φ−1
with εt the nominal exchange rate. The domestic consumption basket Cd,t is deﬁned over a
set Ωt of available consumption goods. As in Bilbiie et al. (2012), we assume that Cd,t and
C∗x,t take a translog form as in Feenstra (2003) such that the elasticity of substitution across
varieties ω in the subset Cd,t increases with the number of available goods in the economy.
The price index associated with translog preferences is
lnPd,t =
1
2σ
(
1
Nt
− 1
N˜t
)
+
1
Nt
∫
ω⊂Ωd,t
ln pd,t(ω)dω
+
σ
2Nt
∫
ω⊂Ωd,t
∫
ω′⊂Ωd,t
ln pd,t(ω) (ln pd,t(ω)− ln pd,t(ω′)) dωdω′
with σ > 0 the price elasticity of demand on an individual good, pd,t(ω) the price of a variety
ω produced and sold at Home, Nt the total number of Home producers (the mass of Ωt),
and N˜t the maximum number of varieties (the mass of Ω). In a small open economy setting,
P ∗t and P
∗
x,t are exogenous.
1.3.2 Production
Producer of variety ω. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each
producing a diﬀerent variety ω. As in Bilbiie et al. (2012), a ﬁrm is a producer of one
product. The number of ﬁrms is endogenous, because of ﬁrm entry. Upon entry, ﬁrms pay
a sunk entry cost fE,t. Exit is exogenous, based on death shock 0 < δ < 1. Production
uses labor and capital. Within each ﬁrm, there is a continuum of jobs, each job is executed
by one worker. Capital is perfectly mobile across ﬁrms and jobs as in Den Haan & Watson
(2000) and Cacciatore & Fiori (2016).
A ﬁlled job i at ﬁrm ω produces Ztzitkαiωt with Zt aggregate productivity, zit match-speciﬁc
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productivity, kiωt stock of capital allocated to the job. Within each ﬁrm, jobs with identical
productivity zit produce the same amount of output. As a result, i be can ignored. Each
job is characterized by its match-speciﬁc productivity zt. zt is a per-period i.i.d. draw from
a time-invariant distribution with c.d.f. G(z), positive support, and density g(z). When
solving the model, we assume that G(z) is lognormal with log-scale µz and shape σz. Total
output for producer ω is
yωt = Ztlωt
1
[1−G (zcωt)]
∫ ∞
zcωt
kαωt(z)zg(z)dz
zcωt endogenous threshold below which jobs that draw zt < z
c
ωt are not proﬁtable. As in
Leduc & Liu (2016), the aggregate TFP shock Zt follows the stochastic process
lnZt = ρz lnZt−1 + σztzt (1.1)
with 0 < ρZ < 1. zt is an i.i.d.innovation to the technology shock and is a standard normal
process, with mean zero and unit variance. The time-varying standard deviation of the
innovation σzt captures technology uncertainty shock. σzt follows the stochastic process
lnσzt = (1− ρσz) lnσz + ρσz lnσz,t−1 + σσzσzt (1.2)
with 0 < ρσz < 1. 
σz
t is an i.i.d.innovation to the technology uncertainty shock and is
a standard normal process, with mean zero and unit variance. σzt and σσz respectively
controls the degree of mean volatility and stochastic volatility in TFP. Firms sells at home
and abroad. The demand faced by producer ω is
yωt = yd,t(ω) + yx,t(ω)
with
yd,t(ω) = (1− γ)σ ln
(
p¯d,t
pd,t(ω)
)
Pd,t
pd,t(ω)
(
Pd,t
Pt
)−φ
Y Ct
yx,t(ω) = γσ ln
(
p¯x,t
px,t(ω)
)
Px,t
px,t(ω)
(
Px,t
εtP ∗t
)−φ
Y C∗t
where Y C and Y C∗t denote aggregate demand at Home and abroad. Notice that P
∗
t
expressed in Foreign currency, while Px and px,t(ω) are in Home currency. The maximum
prices that a domestic producer can charge is lower when faced with a larger number of
14
competitors Nt
ln p¯d,t =
1
σNt
+
1
Nt
∫
ω⊂Ωd,t
ln pd,t(ω)dω
ln p¯x,t =
1
σNt
+
1
Nt
∫
ω⊂Ωx,t
ln px,t(ω)dω
Search and matching frictions Labor markets are characterized by search and matching
frictions. Hirings are subject to costs of posting vacancy κ. The number of matched workers
Mt are such that
Mt = χU
ε
t V
1−ε
t
with χ > 0, 0 < ε < 1, Ut the total number of unemployed workers in the economy and Vt
the aggregate number of vacancies. The probability of ﬁlling a vacancy is qt = MtVt and labor
market tightness is θt = VtUt . Firms select capital after observing aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks. Let vωt denote the vacancies posted by producer ω. Total capital stock for ﬁrm ω is
kωt = lωtk˜ωt where
k˜ωt =
1
[1−G (zcωt)]
∫ ∞
zcωt
kαωt(z)g(z)dz
The inﬂow of new workers and the outﬂow of workers due to separations jointly determine
the evolution of ﬁrm level employment.
lωt = (1− λωt) (lωt−1 + qt−1vωt−1)
where λωt = λxt + (1− λxt )G (zcωt) denotes total separations within the ﬁrm ω. λxt is the
fraction of jobs that are exogenously separated in each ﬁrm.
Proﬁt maximization Producer ω's production function can be written as
yωt = Ztz˜ωtk
α
ωtl
1−α
ωt
with kωt = lωtk˜ωt, z˜ωt = 1[1−G(zcωt)]
[∫∞
zcωt
z
1
1−α g(z)dz
]1−α
and k˜ωt = 1[1−G(zcωt)]
∫∞
zcωt
kαωt(z)g(z)dz.
Let ρωt =
pωt
Pt
denote the relative price of good ω with respect to the consumer price index.
ρxωt =
pxt
Pt
as pxt is the export price, expressed in Home consumption units. The ﬁrm
per-period proﬁt (in units of consumption) is
dωt = ρdωtyd,t(ω) + ρxωtyx,t(ω)− w˜ωtlωt − rtkωt − (1− λxt )G (zcωt) (lωt−1 + qt−1vωt−1)F − κvωt
15
where w˜ωt = 1[1−G(zcωt)]
∫∞
zcωt
wωt(z)g(z)dz is the average wage paid by the ﬁrm. When termi-
nating a job, each job incurs a real cost F . Firing costs are not a transfer to workers, they
refer to pure administrative losses. The ﬁrm's program is
Max Πt = Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
βt (1− δ)s−t λt+s
λt
dωs
]
subject to
lωt = (1− λωt) (lωt−1 + qt−1vωt−1) (ψωt)
yωt = yx,t(ω) + yd,t(ω) = Ztlωt
1
[1−G (zcωt)]
∫ ∞
zcωt
kαωt(z)zg(z)dz (ϕωt)
yωt = yx,t(ω) + yd,t(ω) = σ ln
(
p¯d,t
pd,t(ω)
)
Pd,t
pd,t(ω)
(
Pd,t
Pt
)−φ [
(1− γ)Y Ct +Qφt γY C∗t
]
(µωt)
yx,t(ω) = γσ ln
(
p¯x,t
px,t(ω)
)
Px
px,t(ω)
(
Px,t
εtP ∗t
)−φ
Y C∗t (µxωt)
yd,t(ω) = (1− γ)σ ln
(
p¯d,t
pd,t(ω)
)
Pd,t
pd,t(ω)
(
Pd,t
Pt
)−φ
Y Ct (µdωt)
with the real exchange rate Qt ≡ εtP
∗
t
Pt
. The Lagrange multiplier ϕωt captures the marginal
cost of a job. The FOC with respect to kωt equate the marginal productivity of capital to
capital rental rate rt.
Job creation Using the FOCs with respect to υωt and lωt, we obtain the following job
creation condition:
κ
qt
= β (1− δ) (1− λx)Et
[
λt+1
λt
( (
1−G (zcωt+1)) (yωt+1lωt+1 ϕωt+1 (1− α)− w˜ωt+1 + κqt+1)
−G (zcωt+1)F
)]
(1.3)
The ﬁrm determines the optimal number of vacancies such that the cost of vacancy posting
(κ incurred during an average number of periods of 1
qt
) equal the expected return of a ﬁlled
vacancy (which includes, if the job is not destroyed, future labor productivity and vacancy
costs saved on next period's job, net of wage cost, and, for lost jobs, ﬁring costs).
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Job destruction The job destruction equation deﬁnes a productivity threshold zcωt below
which a job is destroyed
(1− α)ϕωtyωt
lωt
[
zcωt
z˜t
] 1
1−α
− wωt (zcωt) +
κ
qt
= −F (1.4)
The job destruction equation states that, at productivity level zcωt, the ﬁrm's outside option
(ﬁring the worker, thereby incurring the ﬁring cost F ) equals its proﬁt (marginal product,
net of labor costs) in addition to the recruitment costs the ﬁrm saves by keeping the worker.
Price setting The relative price of a variety ω is ρdωt =
pdωt
Pt
and ρxωt =
pxωt
Pt
. Price setting
is such that
ρdωt = ρxωt = µωtϕωt (1.5)
Let θωt =
−∂lnyωt
∂lnpωt
denote the price elasticity of total demand for variety ω. Then the ﬁrm's
mark up over marginal cost µωt = θωtθωt−1 .
Wage setting
The wage is the solution of the Nash bargaining process that splits the surplus of the match
between the ﬁrm and the worker as in most of the labor search literature. At the symmetric
equilibrium, all ﬁrms ω behave similarly. The average wage is then
w˜t = (b+ hp) (1− η) + η
[
(1− α)ϕt ytlt + κθt
+
(
1− (1− δ) (1− λx) (1− st) βEt
[
λt+1
λt
])
F
]
with st = MtUt the job ﬁnding rate and η the worker's bargaining power. The wage is a
weighted sum of the worker's outside option and the value of the match for the ﬁrm, which
includes the expected marginal product of labor, the search costs saved by the ﬁrms because
she kept the worker within the ﬁrm. Firing costs have two opposing eﬀects on the current
wage. On the one hand, the ﬁrm saves today the ﬁring costs, which increases the current
wage. On the other hand, the ﬁrm will pay future ﬁring costs, in case of job separation in
the next period, which lowers the current wage.
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Firm entry
As in Cacciatore & Fiori (2016), prior to entry, ﬁrms pay a sunk entry cost
fEt = fRt + fTt + κv
e
t (1.6)
The ﬁrst two terms represent, respectively, the costs in terms of goods and services imposed
by regulatory and administrative barriers to market entry (fRt) and technological require-
ments for business creation (fTt) such as research and development (R&D), nonresidential
structures, etc. fRt + fTt are paid in terms of the ﬁnal good Yt. Upon entry, new entrants
choose the same amount of labor as incumbent. They then post vet vacancies such that
vet =
lt+qtvt
qt
. Prospective entrants compute their expected post-entry value, such that is the
present discounted value of their expected proﬁt stream
et = Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
βt (1− δ)s−t λt+s
λt
ds
]
(1.7)
The free entry condition is et = fEt. As in Bilbiie et al. (2012), we introduce a one-period
time-to-build lag. New and incumbent ﬁrms can be hit by a death shock with probability
δ ∈ (0, 1) at the end of the period. The law of motion is given by
Nt = (1− δ) (Nt−1 +NEt−1)
Upon exit, the ﬁrm's workers join the unemployment pool.
1.3.3 Household budget constraint
Household accumulates physical capital and rent it to ﬁrms. Investment consists of domestic
and foreign goods, in the same fashion as the consumption basket. Capital accumulation
obeys a standard law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + It
[
1− ν
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
(1.8)
with scale parameter ν > 0 and 0 < δK < 1 capital depreciation rate. On the international
ﬁnancial market, households have access to foreign-currency risk-free bonds. Let us deﬁne
b∗t =
B∗t
P ∗t
real holdings of Foreign-currency bonds (in units of Foreign consumption). We
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assume a quadratic cost of adjusting Foreign bond holding, as in Benigno (2009). In addition,
households hold shares in a mutual fund of ﬁrms. As in Ghironi & Melitz (2005), household
savings are made available to prospective entrants to cover their entry costs through the
mutual fund. xt denotes the share in the mutual fund held by the household at the beginning
of period t. The representative household receives each period, Ntdt, the total proﬁt of all
ﬁrms that produce in that period (in units of consumption). Each period t, the household
buys xt+1 shares in a mutual fund of Nt+NEt ﬁrms. Household's budget constraint (in units
of consumption basket) is
Ct + bt +Qtb
∗
t +
ξ
2
Qt (b
∗
t )
2 + (Nt +NE,t) etxt+1 + It
= rtKt +Wt +Qtb∗t−1 (1 + i∗) +Ntxt (dt + et) + (1 + it−1)
Pt−1
Pt
bt−1
+ (b+ hp) (1− Lt) + Πt + Tt (λt)
where Tt are lump-sum transfers, ξ > 0 the scale parameter on adjustment costs on Foreign
bond holding. This is a small open economy. As a result, Foreign variables are considered as
exogenous. In addition, as we focus on technological shocks, Foreign variables are assumed
to be constant. λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The
ﬁrst-order condition on Foreign holding is
1 + ξb∗t = β(1 + i
∗)Et
[
λt+1
λt
Qt+1
Qt
]
(1.9)
Choice of investment in ﬁrm entry is such that
et = β(1− δ)Et
[
λt+1
λt
(dt+1 + et+1)
]
(1.10)
Household's choice on capital is such that
ζKt = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(
ϕt+1α
Yt+1
Kt+1
)
+ ζKt+1(1− δ)
]
(1.11)
ζKt
[
1− ν
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− ν It
It−1
(
It
It−1
− 1
)]
+ βEt
[
λt+1
λt
ζKt+1
(
It+1
It
)2
ν
(
It+1
It
− 1
)]
= 1
(1.12)
19
with ζKt is the multiplier associated with equation (1.8) and captures the shadow price of
capital.
1.3.4 Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, the elasticity of substitution across varieties is θt = 1 + σNt
and the mark-up
µt = 1 +
1
σNt
=
θt
θt − 1 (1.13)
As the number of producers Nt increases, the mark up decreases. As a result, the relative
price
ρt = exp
[
−1
2
N˜t −Nt
σN˜tNt
]
(1.14)
declines if Nt falls. Total employment is Lt = Ntlt, the law of motion of employment is
Lt = (1− λt) (1− δ) [Lt−1 + qt−1Vt−1] while the mass of unemployed workers is Ut = 1− Lt.
Total vacancies are Vt = (Nt +NE,t) vt +NE,t ltqt while aggregate capital is Kt = Ntkt. Total
output for all producing ﬁrms in terms of consumption units is Yt = ρtZtz˜tKαt L
1−α
t .
8 As
pointed out by Ghironi & Melitz (2005), the number of ﬁrms behaves very much like a capital
stock. Aggregate variables are directly aﬀected by changes in the number of producers. Firm
entry then potentially provides a potent magniﬁcation mechanism to uncertainty shocks.
Current account dynamics is given by
Qtb
∗
t −Qtb∗t−1 = Qtb∗t−1i∗ + ρtNtyt − Y Ct (1.15)
with
Y C = CM +NE,t (fRt + fTt) + κVt + It + FLt
G (zct )
[1−G (zct )]
+
ξ
2
Qt (b
∗
t )
2
Notice, in equation (1.15), that Home resources are scaled by the number of producers Nt
and the relative price ρt (that comoves with Nt, equation (1.14)). A fall in the number of
producers Nt then reduces Home aggregate production through these two channels.
8Because of the love for variety, measures in units of consumption are not data-consistent. The aggregate
price index in the model takes into account changes in the number of available products, which is not the
case in CPI data. Ghironi & Melitz (2005) suggest to solve this problem by deﬂating all variables using an
average price index. When we assess the model's ﬁt with the data, we make sure to consider data-consistent
variables.
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1.4 Eﬀects of uncertainty shocks
1.4.1 Solution method and calibration
Solution method Uncertainty shocks, which are the second-moment shocks in our model
only enter the model's policy functions independently from the level shocks at third order.
Hence, the model is solved using a third-order approximation around the deterministic steady
state. We then simulate the model and compute moments of endogenous variables using
pruning9. The Dynare is used for that purpose (Adjemian et al. (2014)).
As argued in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), higher order approximation moves the
economy away from its deterministic steady state. This implies responses as deviations of
the deterministic steady state are not informative. To overcome this problem, we simulate
the model for 4000 periods conditioning on future shocks by setting them to 0 and consider
the values reached after the simulation as the "stochastic steady state"10. All IRFs are then
computed as deviations from the stochastic steady state.
Calibration We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency and choose parameter values
from the literature to match features of the Korean economy. However, when data is not
available for Korea, we use standard values in the literature. The benchmark calibration
is summarized in Table 1.1 . We choose standard values for all the parameters that are
conventional in the literature: the discount factor β, risk aversion σC , the capital share in
the Cobb-Douglas production function α, and the capital depreciation rate δK (β = 0.99,
σC = 1, α = 0.33, and δK = 0.025). Moreover, we set workers' bargaining power parameter
η to 0.6 following Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001). Using Hosios (1990) condition, we set
also the elasticity of matches to unemployment ε to 0.6. Adjustment costs on capital are set
such that the model matches the relative volatility of investment (leading to ν = 0.5).
Concerning the parameters related to the product market, we set regulation entry cost
fR following the procedure described in Ebell & Haefke (2009). Djankov et al. (2002)'s
assessment of entry costs in Korea amounts to 27% of annual GDP per capita. We then
infer the entry costs in terms of months of lost output. We add this measure to Pissarides
9To ensure stable sample paths, pruning discards higher order terms when iteratively computing simula-
tions of the solution. At third order, Dynare 4.4.3 uses the pruning algorithm of Andreasen et al. (2013)
10Born & Pfeifer (2014) use the term EMAS (the ergodic mean in the absence of shocks). It is the point
of the state space where, in absence of shocks in that period, agents would choose to remain although they
are taking future volatility into account.
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(2001)' index of entry costs (converted in the same unit of months of lost output).11
We set the technological entry cost fT such that aggregate R&D expenditures are 1.7
percent of GDP as in Cacciatore & Fiori (2016). In order to get the calibrated value of fT ,
we convert the empirical target in terms of quarterly output per capita. The calibrated value
is a lower bound for the Korean economy as Korea is characterized by the largest growth in
R&D expenditures over the recent years (OECD (2015b)).
To pin down the ﬁrm exit rate δ, we target the portion of worker separation due to ﬁrm
exit equal to 26 percent, within the range of estimates reported by Haltiwanger et al. (2006).
We set the price elasticity of demand on an individual good, σ, such that the steady state
markup is 10 percent, a benchmark value in the literature.
We now turn to the parameters that are speciﬁc to the search and matching framework.
Unemployment beneﬁt b, are equal to 61 percent of the steady state wage (OECD, Beneﬁts
and Wages Database, Korea)12. We choose the exogenous separation rate, λx, so that the
percentage of jobs counted as destroyed in a given year that fail to reappear in the following
year is 71 percent as in Cacciatore & Fiori (2016). We set home production, hp, the matching
eﬃciency parameter, χ, and ﬁring costs, F , to match the total quarterly separation rate, λ,
the unemployment rate, U , and the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, q. We set U = 11.2,
q = 0.6, and λ = 0.027, in line with the estimates in Appendix 1.5. The resulting ﬁring costs
and home production appear to be, respectively, 3 percent of average wage and 31 percent
of average wage, at the steady state. For the lognormal scale and shape parameters, µz and
σz, we normalize µz to zero, and choose σz such that the model reproduces the variability of
the job separation rate. Hiring costs as a fraction of steady-state average wage is κ
w
= 0.10,
close to the estimates by Abowd & Kramarz (1997) on French data. We consider France as
a heavily regulated labor market, as in Korea.
As for the open economy dimension, as in Cacciatore et al. (2016), elasticity of substi-
tution between domestic and foreign goods φ is 3.8, and adjustment costs on Foreign bonds
ξ = 0.0025. The share of imports in total consumption γ is set to 0.3, which is consistent
with OECD data on Korean imports. Foreign interest rate i∗ is pinned down by the Euler
equation on Foreign bonds.
11Korea does not appear in Pissarides (2001)' sample. However, according to Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2003)'s
index of product market regulation, Korea's level of product market regulation is similar to Italy, Portugal
and Spain. These countries appear in Pissarides (2001)' sample. We consider the Italian measure as a
proxy for Korea. The implied regulation cost amount to 3.28 quarters of ﬁrm-level steady state output.
Korea indeed ranks high in the OECD PMR index and in Djankov et al. (2002)'s listing of heavily regulated
markets.
12We consider net replacement rates during the initial phase of unemployment
22
We calibrate the parameters in the ﬁrst-moment shock. We set the persistence parameter
to ρz = 0.9 and choose the average standard deviation, σz, to match the absolute standard
deviation of GDP in the data. When it comes to the parameters in the second-moment shock,
we set the standard deviation of the uncertainty shock to σσz = 0.17 and the persistence
parameter to ρσz = 0.70, based on our VAR estimation from section 1.2. We check in
Appendix 1.5 that the moments predicted by the model provides a satisfactory match of the
data.
Table 1.1: Calibration
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 0.99
σC Risk aversion 1
α Capital share 0.33
δK Capital depreciation rate 0.025
σ Variety elasticity 13.5
δ Plant exit 0.007
fR Regulation entry cost 7.9
fT Technology entry cost 7.8
v Investment adjustment costs 0.5
λ Total quarterly separation rate 0.027
b/w Unemployment beneﬁt replacement ratio 0.61
F Firing costs 0.0483
ε Matching function elasticity 0.6
η Worker's bargaining power 0.6
χ Matching eﬃciency 0.32
κ Vacancy cost 0.0966
σz Lognormal shape 0.08
ρz TFP, persistence 0.9
σz TFP, standard deviation 0.0105
ρσz TFP uncertainty, persistence 0.70
σσz TFP uncertainty 0.17
1.4.2 Impulse response functions
Figure 1.3 displays the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a one-standard
deviation increase in technology uncertainty shock.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a one-standard deviation tech-
nology uncertainty shock
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Mechanisms at work
Precautionary savings. As in the standard RBC model, uncertainty creates a precau-
tionary saving motive: domestic households want to consume less and save more in order
to insure themselves against future shocks. Since marginal utility is convex, the stochas-
tic discount rate (β λt+1
λt
) goes up following an uncertainty shock as in Fernandez-Villaverde
et al. (2011), which raises the value of investing in job creation (equation (1.3)), ﬁrms entry
(equation (1.10)), foreign bonds (equation (1.9)) and physical capital (equation (1.11)).
Real option value. Uncertainty also makes economic agents cautious about decisions like
employment, which adjustment costs can make expensive to reverse. Thus, it gives rise to
a contractionary real option-value eﬀect. In our model, real options apply to key decisions:
hirings, ﬁring and ﬁrm entry.
As for hirings, unlike in a standard RBC model, employment cannot adjust each period
due to search and matching frictions. Vacancy posting decisions are based on the expected
value of a ﬁlled vacancy (equation (1.3)), which is determined by the stochastic discount
rate times the expected surplus of a match. On the one hand, the stochastic discount rate
increases, which raises the expected value of a ﬁlled vacancy. The present value of a job
match goes up. On the other hand, a job match is an irreversible long-term employment
relation. Therefore, the expected volatility of the economy aﬀects the expected value of a
ﬁlled vacancy (right hand-side of equation (1.3)), thereby introducing a real option eﬀect.
When uncertainty hits the economy, the option value of waiting rises, causing a drop in ϕ the
marginal value of a match to the ﬁrm. The real-option eﬀect dominates the precautionary
savings eﬀect. Hence, faced with a lower expected return on the match, ﬁrms post fewer
vacancies.
Separations are also subject to an option value. As productivity can quickly revert, ﬁrms
become more reluctant to separate from their workforce, all the more so as they pay ﬁring
costs. This could lead to less separations. However, conﬂicting forces are at work. As ﬁrms
post lower vacancies, q the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy increases, thereby lowering the
average hiring costs κ
qt
. This creates incentives to destroy more matches as rehiring is less
costly. The combined eﬀect on separations is ambiguous. In the benchmark calibration, job
destruction rises. As a result, the decline in vacancy posting and the increase in separations
push unemployment upward, making it harder for unemployed workers to ﬁnd jobs. The
decline in total employment drives the marginal product of capital downwards, which triggers
a fall in capital investment. The interaction between capital and endogenous separation
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makes the propagation of the shock stronger, as in Den Haan & Watson (2000).
Let us have a look at ﬁrm dynamics. As ﬁrm entry entails sunk costs (equation (1.6)),
real option channel also applies to ﬁrm entry. With higher uncertainty, e the expected value
of a ﬁrm falls, which drives ﬁrm entry down. The number of producers eventually declines,
raising mark-up (equation (1.13)).
Interaction between search frictions and ﬁrm entry Firm dynamics have an impact
on job creation and separation decisions, and vice versa. First, ﬁrm entry condition (equation
(1.6)) depends on labor market conditions. With lower vacancies and higher unemployment,
labor market tightness declines, which drives ﬁrm entry cost down. Nonetheless, the number
of ﬁrms still falls in response to higher uncertainty due to the option value channel. Secondly,
ﬁrm entry also aﬀects job creation and job destruction (in equations (1.3) and (1.4)) as ϕ,
the marginal cost of a job, depends on the number of competitors. The fall in the number
of ﬁrms N drives the relative price ρ downward (equation (1.14)) and raises the mark-up.
The price-setting (equation (1.5)) implies that the real marginal beneﬁt of a match ϕ goes
down. Hence, the fall in the stock of ﬁrms ampliﬁes the initial decline in vacancy posting,
making expected future proﬁts less. At the same time, it reinforces job destruction as existing
matches become less valuable to the ﬁrm. Finally, with a reduced stock of ﬁrms, the total
number of vacancy posting falls, making labor market tightness even lower. Overall, ﬁrm
dynamics ampliﬁes the deterioration in labor market conditions.
Open economy dimension and interaction with ﬁrm dynamics. We lay stress, in
the previous paragraphs, on the fall of the Home relative price ρ. This eﬀect drives consumer
price index down, thereby generating a real exchange rate depreciation (Q rises). This is
consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in section 1.2.
In addition, a rise in uncertainty induces households to save more and consume less. In
the standard RBC closed economy model, this precautionary savings motive translates into
higher investment, which is counterfactual. In our model, the domestic household has several
investment opportunities to smooth consumption: jobs, capital, ﬁrms or foreign bonds. As
pointed out in the previous paragraphs, the value of domestic physical capital, jobs, and
ﬁrms fall. Households are then enticed to invest in Foreign bonds whose returns i∗ are not
aﬀected by the local uncertainty shock. The rise in uncertainty generates a current account
surplus. To further understand the current account dynamics, let us rewrite equation (1.9)
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as
1 + ξb∗t = β(1 + i
∗)
[
Et
(
λt+1
λt
)
Et
(
Qt+1
Qt
)
+ cov
(
λt+1
λt
,
Qt+1
Qt
)]
(1.16)
It is clear from equation (1.16) that the rise in β λt+1
λt
entices households to buy more Foreign
bonds. The real exchange rate depreciation (rise in Q driven by relative prices and ﬁrm
dynamics) ampliﬁes this urge to invest in Foreign bonds. The covariance between changes
in the discount rate and real exchange rate is also positive. In other words, consumers use
foreign bonds to smooth consumption, all the more so as the Home currency depreciates
(foreign currency appreciates in real terms). As the foreign bond is denominated in foreign
currency, it provides an interesting hedging device against the fall in Home consumption
purchasing power if Foreign currency appreciates when Home consumption falls.
In the description of the economic mechanisms we just provided, we lay stress on the link
between the magnitude of real exchange rate depreciation and the current account surplus.
As changes in the real exchange rate stem from ﬁrm dynamics (through changes in relative
price ρ), the model display a strong interaction between the open economy dimension and
ﬁrm dynamics.
Understanding the respective role of search and matching, open economy and
ﬁrm entry
In order to provide further understanding of the respective role of search and matching, open
economy and ﬁrm entry in the model, we display the response of the economy to a technology
uncertainty shock in 3 diﬀerent models. We start with the simple model with search and
matching frictions and endogenous separations (no ﬁrm entry, closed economy) and analyze
the eﬀects of endogenous separation. We extend then this simple model along one dimension:
either ﬁrm entry (a model with search and matching frictions in an closed economy, with
ﬁrm entry) or the open economy dimension (a model with search and matching frictions in
an open economy, no ﬁrm entry).13 Table 1.2 summarizes our ﬁndings and contribution to
the literature. Results of existing works are either incomplete or inconsistent with respect
to Korean data. With search and matching frictions and endogenous separations (row 3. of
Table 1.2), the model predicts an increase in investment and job ﬁnding rate. Firm entry
13Each model is not an extreme calibration of the full model. We actually wrote separate models. In all
models, all parameter values are kept at their benchmark values reported in Table 1.1, except the parameters
whose value is derived at the steady state (home production, matching eﬃciency and ﬁring costs) that are
computed to match the same empirical targets: Unemployment, vacancy ﬁlling rate and total quarterly
separation rate.
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(row 4. of Table 1.2) helps the model predict a fall in investment and job ﬁnding rate, which
is consistent with empirical evidence. The stock of ﬁrms also falls, as in the data. The
addition of the open economy dimension (row 5.) does not solve the counterfactual rise in
the job ﬁnding rate but helps the model predict a fall in investment. Moreover, the behavior
of open-economy variables match the data. The following subsections describe the economic
mechanisms and underline the interaction between search and matching, open economy and
ﬁrm entry.
Table 1.2: Responses of macroeconomic variables to increased uncertainty
C I E U JFR JSR N CA RER
1. Korean Data - - + - + - + +
Our paper
2. Benchmark - - - + - + - + +
3. SaM only (endo. sep.) - +∗ +∗
4. SaM + Firm entry (closed economy) - - -
5. SaM + open economy (no ﬁrm entry) - +∗ + +
Neo Keynesian model (sticky p.)
6. Basu & Bundick (2017) - - -
Search and matching (closed economy)
7. Leduc & Liu (2016) , sticky p., exo. sep. - +
8. Guglielminetti (2016), ﬂex. p., exo. sep. - - + -
9. Miyamoto (2016), ﬂex. p., endo. sep. - + +∗ +
Open economy (no search and matching)
10. Kollmann (2016) +∗ + -∗
11. Fogli & Perri (2015) - +∗ +∗ +
12. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) - - +∗ +
C consumption, I investment, E employment, U unemployment, JFR Job Finding Rate, JSR Job Separation Rate, N number of ﬁrms, CA
Current Account, RER Real Exchange Rate (+ means depreciation of national currency)
Following an increase in uncertainty, based on IRFs displayed in paper. "+": IRF displays an increase in the short-run. "-": based on IRFs
displayed in paper, IRF displays a decrease in the short-run.
* : counterfactual IRF. Example: displays a "+", should be "-" to be consistent with the data. Or vice versa.
"sticky p.": sticky price; "ﬂex. p": ﬂexible price. "exo. sep." / "endo. sep.": exogenous / endogenous job separation.
Leduc & Liu (2016) develop a model without capital, hence without investment.
Search and matching with endogenous separation. With respect to Leduc & Liu
(2016), our model includes endogenous separation and capital. Figure 1.4 shows that the
addition of job separation and capital (SaM only) actually moves the model further away
from the data. Indeed, the model predicts an counterfactual increase in investment and job
ﬁnding rate (row 3. of Table 1.2). Due to real option value, job creation and destruction
both decrease. The combined eﬀect lowers unemployment, making it easier to ﬁnd jobs.
The increase in employment leads to a rise in investment. Endogenous separation seems to
be the key to the counterfactual results. With exogenous separation, lower vacancy would
increase unemployment, leading to lower investment. Guglielminetti (2016) uses a search and
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matching model with exogenous separation and capital. Absent endogenous separation, she
ﬁnds that the model is able to replicate the contemporaneous drop in output, consumption
and investment and the negative impact on the labor market.
Firm entry. To illustrate the link between search frictions and ﬁrm dynamics, we add
ﬁrm dynamics shutting oﬀ the open economy dimension (row 4. of Table 1.2). Figure 1.4
shows that the introduction of ﬁrm entry (SaM + Firm entry) generates a fall in job ﬁnding
rate and investment, which is consistent with the data. As the option value channel also
aﬀects ﬁrm entry decision, the number of producers Nt goes down in uncertain times, which
increases mark up (µ equation (1.13)) and reduce relative prices (ρ equation (1.14)). This
means that the marginal gain from a match ϕ falls (equation (1.5)). Therefore, ﬁrms post
less vacancies and separate from more matches. Unemployed workers face a lower probability
of ﬁnding a job. Investment falls as the decrease in employment reduce the marginal product
of capital.
Figure 1.4: Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation increase in technology uncertainty
shock
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'SaM only' closed economy, no ﬁrm entry. 'SaM + Firm entry' closed economy, ﬁrm entry. The units of
the vertical axes are % change from stochastic steady state. Example : Following a one-standard deviation
shock in uncertainty, jog ﬁnding rate peaks at 0.17% in the model 'SaM only'.
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Adding the open economy dimension. In a closed economy, the precautionary savings
motive entices households to invest more, which is counterfactual. In an open economy,
foreign assets provide an more interesting investment opportunity to build up a buﬀer stock
against future shocks, as the return on Foreign assets i∗ is exogenous (row 5. of Table 1.2).
To highlight the interaction between search frictions and open economy dimension, we open
the economy shutting oﬀ ﬁrm dynamics. In Figure 1.5, with open economy dimension (SaM
+ Open), the Home country runs a current account surplus and the fall in consumption is
larger than in a closed economy setting. In a nutshell, the open economy dimension allows
the model to generate a larger fall in consumption and a drop (rather than an increase) in
investment. The latter further reduces the marginal product of labor, thereby leading to
larger recessionary macroeconomic eﬀects of the uncertainty shock.
Furthermore, ﬁrm entry and open economy dimension interact with each other. The
fall in the stock of ﬁrms, that are associated with real options channel, reinforces the real
exchange rate depreciation, thereby inducing more capital outﬂows (equation (1.16)). In
Figure 1.5, with open economy and ﬁrm entry (the full model), real exchange rate depreciates
more, leading to larger foreign bond holding and current account surplus. This outcome
is consistent with larger reduction in consumption and investment. Moreover, comparing
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 shows that a larger fall in GDP is obtained under the full model because
of the interaction with the open economy dimension. 14
Kollmann (2016) also ﬁnds that, following an unexpected rise in output volatility, Home
net foreign assets increase, which is consistent with our IRFs. However, in Kollmann (2016)'s
2-country model, under complete ﬁnancial markets, the international risk sharing implies
that the rise in Home output volatility triggers a wealth transfer from the rest of the world
to the Home country, such that Home consumption rises, and the Home real exchange
rate appreciates. These features are counterfactual on Korea data. Fogli & Perri (2015)
show that, in a standard one-good 2-country RBC model, faced with increased domestic
uncertainty, hence increased risk on domestic investment opportunities, agents buy more
foreign assets. Our results show that these mechanisms are also at work in our model.
However, in Fogli & Perri (2015)'s setting, as well as in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011),
the precautionary savings motive entices households to work more, which is counterfactual.
Our model correctly predicts a fall in employment.
14The decline in output is persistent. It is also the case in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), Fogli &
Perri (2015) and Kollmann (2016) as households gradually build-up a buﬀer stock of Foreign assets. Figure
1.4 suggest that ﬁrm dynamics also adds to the persistence of GDP response to increased uncertainty.
30
Figure 1.5: Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation increase in uncertainty shock
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1.5 Conclusion
Using a VAR model, we show that an increase in uncertainty lowers output, consumption,
investment and job ﬁnding rates, while raising job separations and unemployment. We also
supplement the existing empirical evidence by looking at ﬁrm dynamics, real exchange rate
and current account behavior. We ﬁnd that increased uncertainty generates real exchange
rate depreciation, current account surplus and reduces the stock of ﬁrms in the economy.
We then investigate the impact of uncertainty shocks in a small open economy with
search and matching frictions, endogenous job separation and ﬁrm entry to illustrate new
transmission mechanism. Basu & Bundick (2017) points out that papers experience diﬃculty
in generating business-cycle co-movements among output, consumption, investment, and
employment from changes in uncertainty. Our paper succeeds in doing so, in addition to
generating data-consistent a fall in the number of ﬁrms, current account surplus and real
exchange rate depreciation. The key mechanisms are real options channel and precautionary
saving motive. The real options channel aﬀects labor adjustment as well as ﬁrm entry.
Precautionary saving motive gives rise to capital outﬂow and real exchange rate depreciation.
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The interaction of these channels in an open economy setting leads to sizable macroeconomic
eﬀects of heightened uncertainty, and helps reproduce data-consistent results.
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Appendix
A Data
A.1 Measuring worker ﬂows
A.1.1 Economically Active Population Survey
We employ the Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS) conducted by Statistics
Korea. It is cross-sectional monthly household survey, and the sample size consists of ap-
proximately 33,000 households per period (about 70,000 adult individuals). The main goal
of EAPS is to reveal the characteristics of that population with regards to the labor market.
In particular, based upon the main activities indicated for the reference week, Statistics
Korea classiﬁes respondents as follows: those working or absent from work as employed,
those looking for work as unemployed, and all others as inactive. Among inactive, those who
worked for the money more than 1 hour or worked more than 18 hours as non-paid family
worker are classiﬁed as employed and those who searched for job during last 4 weeks are
classiﬁed as unemployed.
A.1.2 Measuring transition rates
We use EAPS from January 1986 through December 2015 to construct the series of worker
ﬂows.15 According to survey design, each household remains in the sample for 36 months,
and 1/36 of total households is renewed each month.16 EAPS's rotation scheme allows us to
match individuals across two consecutive months, and obtain gross ﬂows across labor market
states.17 Note that our analysis focuses on monthly transitions between employment (E) and
unemployment (U), and never consider transition from and to inactivity (I). To calculate the
transition rates, we ﬁrst consider the gross ﬂow NABt of workers that transit from the state
A to the state B over the month. Let nEUt (n
UE
t ) denote the share of employed (unemployed)
workers in period t-1 who are unemployed (employed) in period t:
nEUt =
NEUt
NEEt +N
EU
t
15The EAPS has been in existence since 1963, but microdata in which information on individual charac-
teristics is available have been collected since 1986.
16The survey was redesigned in 2005. Prior to 2005, EAPS maintained a ﬁxed sample over 5 years.
17We match individuals by household ID, person ID, sex, and date of birth for the 1986-2004 period. Since
2005, however, Statistics Korea has not provided household ID and person ID. Thus, we use sex, date of
birth, relation with the head of household, and level of education for the 2005-2015 period.
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nUEt =
NUEt
NEEt +N
EU
t
Then, we seasonally adjust the series using X-13-ARIMA-SEATS method, and corrects
the time aggregation bias. We then compute quarterly averages of the monthly transition
rates, as in Shimer (2012). Figure 1.6 displays the job ﬁnding (ft) and separation (st)
rates in Korea. The correlation of the corresponding steady-state unemployment u = st
st+ft
with actual unemployment rate is very high (0.96), which tends to validate our method for
measuring worker ﬂows.
A.1.3 Contribution of the transition rates to unemployment
We next consider the cyclicality of the job ﬁnding and separation rates following Shimer
(2012). If the economy were in steady state at some date t, the unemployment rate would
be determined by the job ﬁnding and separation rates, st
st+ft
. In quarterly-averaged data,
the correlation between this steady state measure and actual unemployment is 0.96. We use
this strong relationship to calculate the contribution of changes in each of the two transition
rates to ﬂuctuations in unemployment rate.
Let f¯ and s¯ denote the average values of ft and st during the sample period and compute
the hypothetical unemployment rates s¯
s¯+ft
and st
st+f¯
as measures of the contribution of ﬂuc-
tuations in the job ﬁnding and separation rates to overall ﬂuctuation in the unemployment
rate. Figure 1.7 shows the contribution of ﬂuctuations in the job ﬁnding and separation rates
to the ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate. This exercise ﬁnds that the separation rate
contributes much more to accounting for the ﬂuctuation in the unemployment in Korea.
In order to quantify this, Shimer (2012) looks at the comovement of detrended data.
Therefore, we use the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter for detrending with a smoothing parameter of
1600. Over the sample periods, the correlation of the cyclical components of unemployment
and s¯
s¯+ft
is 0.209, while the correlation of unemployment and st
st+f¯
is 0.796. It shows that the
job separation rate is the main driver of the ﬂuctuation in the unemployment rate. These
ﬁndings are consistent with Kim & Lee (2014) who show that inﬂows into unemployment
contributes substantially to unemployment ﬂuctuations in Korea.
A.2 A ﬁrst look at the data
Figure 1.8 displays our measure of uncertainty along with workers' ﬂows and current account
as % of GDP. Visual inspection suggests that increased uncertainty tends to be associated
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Figure 1.6: The job ﬁnding and separation rates
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Source: Authors's calculations and Statistics Korea. Job ﬁnding and separation rates (the left y-axis).
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Figure 1.7: Contribution of ﬂuctuations in the job ﬁnding and separation rates to the ﬂuc-
tuations in the unemployment rate
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Source: Authors' calculations and Statistics Korea. "Hypothetical unemployment rate" in left panel : steady
state unemployment predicted by time-varying job ﬁnding rate, separation rate constant. "Hypothetical
unemployment rate" in right panel : steady state unemployment predicted by time-varying separation rate,
job ﬁnding rate constant.
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with lower job ﬁnding rate, higher separation and increases in current account. The corre-
lation of the uncertainty measure with unemployment outﬂows, inﬂows and current account
as % of GDP are respectively -0.52, 0.72 and 0.49. In section 1.2, we go beyond the de-
scriptive statistics using a structural VAR to identify the causal eﬀect of uncertainty on
macroeconomic dynamics.
Figure 1.8: Job ﬁnding rate, separation rate, current account and uncertainty index
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Source : Authors' calculations and Statistics Korea. See Appendix 3.5. Solid line: the time series mentioned
in the title of the graph. "+" line: Uncertainty measure
A.3 Structural VAR : Robustness checks
This section shows that the impulse response function in Figure 1.2 is robust to alternative
identiﬁcation, volatility measure, and speciﬁcation. Our assumptions to identify uncertainty
shocks imply that uncertainty does not respond to macroeconomic shocks in the impact
period. To check the extent to which this assumption may aﬀect our results, uncertainty is
placed last in our vector. Uncertainty may reﬂect the forecasters' perceptions of bad eco-
nomic times rather than an uncertain future. To control for potential eﬀects from changes
in consumer sentiment, we estimate a ﬁve-variable VAR that includes a consumer sentiment
index as an additional variable. Our uncertainty measure is constructed to take a value 1
for each quarter that uncertainty exceeds the threshold and a 0 otherwise. This indicator
function is used to ensure identiﬁcation comes only from these large, and arguably exoge-
nous, uncertainty shocks rather than the smaller ongoing ﬂuctuations. The outcome of all
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robustness checks are reported in Figure 1.9. In all cases, the responses are comparable to
the baseline.
A.4 Macroeconomic data
The data coverage is 1986Q1-2015Q4.
• Output: real gross domestic product, seasonally adjusted, 2010 reference year, Statis-
tics Korea.
• Consumption: private consumption expenditure, seasonally adjusted, 2010 reference
year, Statistics Korea.
• Investment: the sum of gross capital formation and changes in inventories, seasonally
adjusted, 2010 reference year, Statistics Korea.
• Unemployment rate: oﬃcial unemployment rate, job-search for 4 weeks standard, sea-
sonally adjusted, Statistics Korea.
• Number of ﬁrms: the number of corporations in operation as of end of the relevant
period, semi-annual frequency from 1995H1 to 2014H2, National Tax Statistics. We
use a spline to transform semi-annual data into quarterly data.
• Current account as a % of GDP: seasonally adjusted, OECD Dataset.
• US GDP: real gross domestic product, billions of chained 2009 dollars, quarterly, sea-
sonally adjusted annual rate, FRED
B Business cycle statistics: Model versus data
Finally, we check that the model provides a good ﬁt of the data, with respect to business
cycle statistics. Table 1.3 displays the simulated moments and the moments computed from
Korean data from 1986Q4 to 2015Q4. All quarterly data are seasonally adjusted, logged,
and HP-ﬁltered with smoothing parameter 1600. See Appendix 1.5 for a description of data
sources. As mentioned in the calibration section, some of the model's parameters were chosen
to make the model match output volatility, investment and job separation relative volatility.
The model is simulated with technological shocks (equations (1.1) and (1.2)).
With respect to labor market variables, the model is able to produce volatile job ﬁnding
and separations rates. In particular, separation are more volatile than job ﬁndings, which is
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Figure 1.9: The eﬀects of one-standard deviation shock to uncertainty: robustness checks
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Baseline: baseline VAR. Unc. last: uncertainty placed last in the otherwise baseline VAR. Sentiment:
consumer sentiment index placed on top of the baseline VAR to control for potential eﬀects from movement
in consumers' perception of bad economic times. Threshold: uncertainty measure constructed to take a
value 1 for each quarter that uncertainty exceeds the threshold and a 0 otherwise.
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Table 1.3: Business cycle statistics: Model versus data
Volatility Cyclicality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data Model Data Model
Y(i) 2.07 2.07 1(iii) 1
C(ii) 1.44 0.59 0.86 0.75
I 2.42 2.20 0.83 0.90
JSR 8.74 8.78 -0.73 -0.68
JFR 4.13 3.77 0.48 0.76
U 8.44 9.70 -0.81 -0.77
V 8.54 (iv) 8.73 0.9(iv) 0.35
corr(U,V) -0.80 (iv) -56.4
(i). Output std. in %, in columns (1) and (2).
(ii). For all variables except output, std. relative to output, in columns (1) and (2)
(iii). Correlation with output in columns (3) and (4)
(iv). For want of Korean data, US value
a speciﬁc feature of the Korean economy. The model's predicted volatility of unemployment
and vacancies is consistent with the data. For vacancies, there is no available data on Korean
vacancies, we then report the business cycle statistics on US data.
Consumption is more volatile than output in Korean data. It is a well-known feature
in emerging economies (Aguiar & Gopinath (2007) among others). The model fails to cap-
ture this feature. Capturing the high consumption volatility is beyond the scope of the
paper. Furthermore, the high consumption volatility is not a robust stylized fact in Korean
data. From 1980Q1 to 1995Q4, the relative volatility of consumption was 0.67. The rela-
tive consumption volatility prevailing during this period is closer to the model's predicted
consumption volatility.
Finally, the model predicts a negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
This is an interesting feature as a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies is
a well-known feature of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)'s model with endogenous destruction.
Indeed, with the separation margin, ﬁrms can quickly adjust the employment level, which is
preferred by the ﬁrm as hiring is costly and takes time. Following a positive TFP shock, ﬁrm
can increase employment by keeping more workers, even less productive ones, rather than
waiting for new workers to arrive from the matching market. Vacancies can go down, so
does unemployment, thereby generating a positive correlation between unemployment and
vacancies. With ﬁrm entry, unemployment and vacancies can display a negative correlation
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in spite of endogenous separation. Indeed, as ﬁrm entry falls, with the decline in the number
of ﬁrms actually result in a fall in aggregate vacancies.
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Chapter 2
How Can Taxes Help Ensure a Fair
Globalization?
45
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, trade liberalization has led to a signiﬁcant trade expansion. By 2007,
global trade had reached more than 60 percent of world GDP, compared with less than
30 percent in the mid-1980s (Bacchetta & Bustamante (2009)). Despite its uncontroversial
expansionary eﬀects on global growth, trade expansion has not always been translated into
more equal incomes and better working conditions. Rising concerns on the distributional
eﬀects of trade emphasized the fall in wages for unskilled and low-income workers, as well
as the rise in informal and less protected forms of employment.
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, we assess the impact of trade open-
ness on informality and inequality. Second, we investigate whether taxation may correct
any possible negative eﬀect that trade liberalization may have on labor quality and income
distribution. Our analysis is based on a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model with two asymmetric countries: a developed and a developing country. The originality
of our approach is to extend the Melitz (2003)'s model by introducing search and matching
frictions as in Helpman et al. (2010), but in a dynamic framework, following Cacciatore &
Ghironi (2014). In order to provide a credible impact of tax reforms, we also depart from
the representative agent model by introduce hand-to-mouth agents as in Gali, Lopez-Salido
and Valles (2007). A calibrated version of this model is the parsimonious way to quantify
the transitional dynamics of labor reallocation induced by the world trade liberalization, as
well as the redistributive eﬀect of tax reforms.
The empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the distributional eﬀects of trade
liberalization. On the one side, trade liberalization is deemed to have boosted the demand
of skilled workers and hence triggered an increase in the relative wage of skilled to unskilled
workers, the so-called skill premium. As a consequence, income inequality has widened
(see Epifani & Gancia (2006), Matsuyama (2007), Verhoogen (2008), Goldberg & Pavcnik
(2007) and the literature mentioned herein). On the other side, other studies ﬁnd that trade
liberalization reduces the skill premium and hence inequality especially in middle and low-
income countries (see McCaig (2011) for Vietnam, Zhang & Wan (2006) for China, Amiti
& Cameron (2012) for Indonesia, Robertson (2004) for Mexico, Gonzaga et al. (2006) for
Brazil, Kumar and Mishra (2008) for India).
To address raising inequality, tax policies can play a major role in redistributing income
and making the post-tax income distribution less unequal. Eﬃcient tax systems are im-
portant tools in addressing rising inequality and informality and restoring robust economic
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growth. Indeed, a targeted and well-balanced tax code is an essential element in making fur-
ther progress in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by providing a stable funding
base for high-quality public services for all and eﬀective transfers targeted to those most in
need. However, using tax policies to address income inequality in an open economy faces par-
ticular challenges. In achieving a more equitable distribution of income, governments should
prefer those tax instruments which, at the same time, reduce the incidence of informality.
The high incidence of informality is an issue of concern especially in developing countries,
that already have high informality rates to begin with and are characterized by poor working
conditions.1 On average, more than 50 percent of the labor force in developing countries
is informal. In many Latin American countries informal employment exceeds 50 percent of
total urban labor force (Gasparini & Tornarolli (2007)). Estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa
and Asia are even higher (Jütting et al. (2008)). Nevertheless, informality is a matter of
concern also in advanced economies, although to a lesser extent. During the late 20th cen-
tury there was a general increase in the informal economy in many countries around the
world, including OECD countries (see Schneider & Enste (2000)). Heintz & Pollin (2003),
for example, show that within a data set of 23 countries, 19 showed increases in informal-
ity. Similarly, ILO data from 2002 show that self-employment increased in all developing
regions, and world-wide increased from about one quarter to one third of non-agricultural
employment during the period 1980-2000 (ILO, 2013).
Trade liberalization is deemed to have further increased the incidence of informality. In
developing countries, job creation resulting from trade liberalization has mainly taken place
in the informal economy. In some regions (e.g. Latin American countries), the increase
in informality took place concomitantly, or in the aftermath of, major trade reforms in
diﬀerent countries of the region, which drastically cut tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers, and
opened markets to foreign competition. Indeed, there is a long standing concern about the
labor market consequences of trade liberalization. One major concern in developing countries
is that it could induce substantial reallocation of workers from the formal to the informal
sector (Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003)). The empirical literature provides mixed evidence on
the eﬀects of trade liberalization on informality. Some papers ﬁnd little or no eﬀect of trade
liberalization on informality (e.g. Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003), Menezes-Filho & Muendler
(2011), Bosch et al. (2012)), whereas some others (e.g. Kovak (2013) , Dix-Carneiro & Kovak
(2017)) ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of trade liberalization on informality and wages. The lack of a
clear consensus motivates the need to further investigate the eﬀects of trade liberalization on
1For an overview on job quality in emerging economies, see OECD (2015a).
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informality. If trade liberalization causes labor informality to increase, this could constitute
a potentially large welfare loss from it. In this context, it would be crucial to identify policy
strategies which may curb informality and reduce the incidence of low-quality jobs.
These structural changes, induced by a growing trade, as well as the need to ﬁght rising
inequalities through tax reforms ask for a structural approach. Thus, we develop a two-
country DSGE model with a developed and a developing country (asymmetric equilibrium).
These two countries diﬀer according to the size of the informal sector in the intermediate-
good sector. The informal sector is characterized by a more ﬂexible labor market (i.e. rapid
entry and exit and more ﬂexible adjustment to change in demand) and lower productivity.
In this respect our paper relates to the recent theoretical literature embedding the informal
sector in DSGE models (e.g. Conesa et al. (2002), Busato & Chiarini (2004), Orsi et al.
(2014), Pappa et al. (2015), Dellas et al. (2017)). Within this strand of literature, very
few works enrich DSGE models with both informality and a fully-ﬂedged labor market with
search and matching frictions. The few exceptions, to the best of our knowledge, are Cook
& Nosaka (2006), Zenou (2008), Satchi & Temple (2009), Batini et al. (2011), Bosch &
Esteban-Pretel (2015) and Anand & Khera (2016). However, most of the aforementioned
theoretical works focus on the role of regulation and none of them analyzes the eﬀect of
taxation on informality from both a developed and a developing country perspective.
The novelty of our paper is to focus on the interactions between the choices to partici-
pate at the international trade (Melitz (2003)) and the induced labor reallocations between
formal and informal activities. Starting from the Melitz (2003)'s model where search and
matching frictions are introduced on the labor market as in Helpman et al. (2010), our
original contribution is to propose a dynamic two-country model where asymmetric areas, a
developed and an emerging country, are characterized by diﬀerent incidence of informality.
We model informality as in Charlot et al. (2015). Our model closely follows Cacciatore &
Ghironi (2014). However, Cacciatore & Ghironi (2014) focus on developed economies where
representative agent can be employed in only one sector, the presence of informality being
not considered. In order to fully capture the impact of trade liberalization and tax reform
in emerging economies, it seems to be crucial to model the interplay between the formal
and informal sector. Therefore, our main contribution is that we embed the informal sector,
as we do believe that the analysis of labor market dynamics can not be limited to the sole
formal sector, given the high incidence of informality especially in developing and emerging
countries. Furthermore, in order to assess whether a ﬁscal reform can enable transition to
formalization, we add taxation as well as hand-to-mouth agents in the model, which is not
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embedded in Cacciatore & Ghironi (2014).
Our work is related to the emerging literature analyzing the impact of taxation on in-
formality. Empirical evidence points out that reducing taxation on formal businesses eases
the migration of entrepreneurs from the informal to the formal sector, where productivity
is higher, with positive eﬀect on output and economic eﬃciency (see Slonimczyk (2011) for
Russia and Araujo & Rodrigues (2016) for Brazil). Higher tax rates among ﬁrm-owners
induce not only substantial movements to the informal sector, but also under-reporting of
taxable earnings and income shifting to tax-favored business forms, which may ultimately
lead to ineﬃcient allocation or resources (see Waseem (2018) for an analysis of the Pakistani
tax reform introduced in 2009). If informality is voluntary, lower taxation rates should reduce
ﬁrms' incentives to enter the informal sector. However, even if informality is involuntary,
lower tax rates could reduce informality by encouraging formal sector ﬁrms to expand em-
ployment and create more formal jobs. This strand of the literature suggests that the best
approach to reduce the size of the informal sector is using taxation to reduce the costs of
being formal and create the right incentives for companies and workers intending to switch
to the formal sector.
Our analysis highlights a number of interesting results. We show that trade expansion
resulting from a permanent fall in export costs raises GDP growth rate in both developed
and emerging countries. However, trade expansion and higher levels of economic activity
do not necessarily imply higher employment quality and better working conditions. In
fact, the adjustment on the labor market is crucial in the evaluation of the eﬀects of trade
liberalization. We show that trade liberalization boosts economic activity and employment in
both the formal and informal sector. However, this employment expansion is biased toward
the informal sector, which is not subject to labor regulation and hence is more ﬂexible.
We show that it is possible to correct this bias in favor of the informal sector by reducing
payroll taxes paid in the formal sector. An increase of the consumption tax could be a
relevant strategy to ﬁnance the payroll tax cuts. However, formalization comes at the cost
of widening income inequality between formal and informal workers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model while in
Section 3 we discuss the calibration. We analyze the impact of trade liberalization in Section
4. The impact of a budget-neutral tax reform is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes. Some technical aspects are reported in the Appendix.
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2.2 Model
We develop a two-country model, calibrated on a developed and an emerging country. The
two economies are modeled exactly symmetrically, so that the following description in this
Section holds for both economies. Variables appearing with an asterisk refer to the modeled
foreign economy.
There are four actors in each country: households, ﬁrms producing intermediate goods,
ﬁrms producing ﬁnal goods and the government. The model features heterogeneous house-
holds: Ricardian and non-Ricardian. Ricardian households hold bonds but do not supply
labor, whereas non-Ricardian households do not have access to ﬁnancial markets to ﬁnance
their consumption needs. Therefore, they may decide to either supply labor in the formal
sector, or supply labor in the informal sector or be unemployed. Labor is hence supplied only
by non-Ricardian households to intermediate good producers. Intermediate good producers
operate in a perfect competitive market and hire labor  either on the formal or informal
market  to produce intermediate goods which are sold to ﬁnal good producers. Final good
producers combine intermediate goods into a ﬁnal good which is sold on a monopolistically-
competitive market. Finally, to provide public goods and unemployment beneﬁts, the gov-
ernment collects taxes paid on consumption by all households as well as payroll taxes paid
only by employees and employers (i.e. intermediate good producers) operating in the formal
sector.
For the sake of simplicity, the model does not feature nominal price rigidities and goods
are produced using only labor without capital.
2.2.1 Households
There are two types of households in the economy: Ricardian and non-Ricardian. Ricardian
households (indexed by a) do not work, hold assets and have access to international ﬁnancial
markets. Non-Ricardian households supply labor, but have no access to ﬁnancial markets.
Non-Ricardian households can work in the formal sector (indexed by F ), work in the informal
sector (indexed by I) or being unemployed (indexed by u).
For all agents, the consumption basket Ct aggregates Home and Foreign consumption in
a Dixit-Stiglitz form:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
φ−1
φ di
] φ
φ−1
(2.1)
where φ > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across goods. The corresponding
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consumption-based price index, Pt, is given by:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−φdi
] 1
1−φ
(2.2)
Ricardian agents smooth their consumption, Cat, over time and thus maximize the life-
time utility function E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
[
(Cat)1−γc
1−γc
]
, where γ is the risk aversion parameter and β is
the discount factor. Utility maximization is subject to the following budget constraint:
At+1 + StA
∗
t+1 + Pt
ψ
2
(
At+1
Pt
)2
+ StP
∗
t
ψ
2
(
A∗t+1
P ∗t
)2
+ (1 + τ ct )PtCat
= (1 + iNt )At + (1 + i
∗N
t )A
∗
tSt + Pt(T
A
t + T
i
t + T
f
t )
Ricardian agents hold domestic assets At (denominated in domestic currency) on which they
receive the nominal interest rate iNt and foreign assets A
∗
t+1 (denominated in foreign currency)
on which they receive the interest rate i∗Nt . Assets are subject to quadratic adjustment costs,
measured by the parameter ψ . These costs are paid to ﬁnancial intermediaries whose only
function is to collect these transaction fees and rebate the revenue to households in lump-sum
fashion in equilibrium. Ricardian households pay a consumption tax τ ct on their consumption
Cat . St is the nominal exchange rate. Moreover, T
A
t is a lump-sum rebate of costs of adjusting
asset holdings from the intermediaries to which it is paid and T it and T
f
t are a lump-sum
rebate of proﬁts from intermediate and ﬁnal goods production.23
If we denote At+1
Pt
= at+1 and
A∗t+1
P ∗t
= a∗t+1, we can re-write the budget constraint in real
terms:
at+1 +Qta
∗
t+1 +
ψ
2
(at+1)
2 +Qt
ψ
2
(
a∗t+1
)2
+ (1 + τ ct )Cat
=
(1 + iNt )
1 + pit
at +
(1 + i∗Nt )
1 + pi∗t
Qta
∗
t + T
A
t + T
i
t + T
f
t
where pit is the inﬂation rate and 1 + pit = PtPt−1 . The term Qt = StP
∗
t /Pt stands for the real
exchange rate. If we deﬁne the domestic and foreign gross real interest rates as 1+it =
(1+iNt )
1+pit
2We assume that Ricardian households are ﬁrms' owners.
3The deﬁnition of this set of lump-sum rebate of costs and proﬁts is the same as in Cacciatore and
Ghironi (2015) and hence we refer to their paper for a complete derivation of these variables. The only
diﬀerence in our model concerns the lump-sum rebate of proﬁts from intermediate goods, which is deﬁned
as: T it = Pt
(
φtZFtlFt − wFtPt lFt − wItPt lIt − κFVFt − κIVIt
)
.
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and 1 + i∗t =
(1+i∗Nt )
1+pi∗t
, we can re-write the budget constraint as:
at+1 +Qta
∗
t+1 +
ψ
2
(at+1)
2 +
ψ
2
Qt
(
a∗t+1
)2
+(1+τ ct )Cat = (1+ it)at+(1+ i
∗
t )a
∗
tQt+T
A
t +T
i
t +T
f
t
(2.3)
where it and i∗t are respectively the real interest rates on domestic and foreign assets.
The Euler equations for domestic and foreign asset holding are respectively:
(1 + ψat+1) = (1 + it+1)βEt
(
C−γcat+1
C−γcat
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
(2.4)
(1 + ψa∗t+1) = (1 + i
∗
t+1)βEt
(
C−γcat+1
C−γcat
Qt+1
Qt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
(2.5)
On the other hand, non-Ricardian households do not have access to ﬁnancial markets
and hence they can ﬁnance their consumption needs either though labor income (wFt if they
supply labor to the formal sector and wIt if they supply labor to the informal sector) or
through unemployment beneﬁts (bt) if they do not work.
The following equations deﬁne non-Ricardian agents' consumption depending on whether
they work in the formal sector, or they work in the informal sector, or they are unemployed:
CFt =
(1− τwFt)
(1 + τ ct )
wFt lFt (2.6)
CIt =
wIt
(1 + τ ct )
lIt (2.7)
Cut =
bt
(1 + τ ct )
(1− lt) (2.8)
The payroll tax on employees, τwFt, is borne only by non-Ricardian agents employed in
the formal sector. Total labor supply, lt, is the sum of labor supplied by non-Ricardian
households in the formal and informal sector, i.e. lt = lFt + lIt. In equilibrium, aggregate
unemployment is given by:
Ut = 1− lFt − lIt (2.9)
Total consumption Ct is deﬁned as the weighted sum of consumption of Ricardian house-
holds (Cat) and non-Ricardian households working in the formal sector (CFt), in the informal
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sector (CIt) or unemployed (Cut):
Ct = ωCat + (1− ω)(CFt + CIt + Cut) (2.10)
where ω is the share of Ricardian households.
2.2.2 Production
There are two vertically integrated production sectors. In the upstream, in both the formal
and the informal sector, intermediate goods are produced in perfect competition using only
labor. Intermediate goods are then sold to ﬁnal good producers. In the downstream, each
sector i is populated by a representative monopolistically competitive multi-product ﬁrm,
which uses intermediate goods as inputs to produce diﬀerentiated varieties. In equilibrium,
some of these varieties are exported while others are sold only on the domestic market.
Intermediate goods
We assume a unit mass of intermediate good producers, which operate both in the formal and
informal sector. Both sectors are subject to search and matching frictions as in the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides framework. Unemployed agents search for a job in both sectors and
search eﬀorts are endogenous. Wages are set though an individual bargaining process.
We assume a constant-return-to-scale matching technology in each sector j, for j = F, I,
where F and I refer respectively to the formal and the informal sector. The matching
technology converts aggregate unemployed workers, Ut, and aggregate vacancies, Vt, into
aggregate matches, Mt. The matching rate in each j sector is:
Mjt = χj(ejtUt)
1−εV εjt (2.11)
where Ut is the total number of unemployed workers and Vt is the number of vacancies. The
parameters χ and  measure respectively the matching eﬃciency and the matching function
elasticity, with χ > 0 and 0 <  < 1. Let ejt denote search eﬀorts for the job type j when
agents are unemployed.
The job ﬁlling rate, qt, is:
qjt =
Mjt
Vjt
= χj
(
ejtUt
Vjt
)1−
(2.12)
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The job ﬁnding rate, ι is:
ιjt =
Mjt
Ut
= χj
(
Vjt
ejtUt
)
ejt (2.13)
As in Krause and Lubik (2007), we assume that newly created matches become productive
only in the next period. The law of motion of employment, ljt, is:
ljt = (1− λj)ljt−1 + qjt−1vjt−1 (2.14)
where λj ∈ (0, 1) is the exogenous separation rate and vjt is the number of vacancies posted
by the ﬁrm in period t. In equilibrium vjt = Vjt.
Firms, both in the formal and informal sector, hire labor lt to produce an intermediate
good yjt according to the following technology :
yIntjt = Zjtljt ∀ j = F, I (2.15)
where Zjt is an exogenous technology term which follows an autoregressive process AR(1):
logZjt = φ
Z1 logZjt−1 + φZ2 logZ∗jt−1 + 
Z
jt. (2.16)
In both sectors j = F, I, intermediate ﬁrms choose the number of vacancies, vjt, and
employment, ljt, to maximize the discount value of their proﬁts:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
uC,t
uC,0
(
ϕtZjtljt − wjtljt(1 + τ fjt)− κjvjt
)
(2.17)
subject to the law of motion for labor: ljt = (1 − λj)ljt−1 + qjt−1vjt−1. where ϕt is the real
price at which intermediate goods producers sell their goods to ﬁnal good producers and it
is expressed in units of consumption4; wFt is the wage paid to workers in the formal sector
(lFt), while wIt is the wage paid to workers in the informal sector (lIt). In both sectors,
intermediate good producers incur a cost of κj units of consumption per vacancy posted
vjt. The term τ
f
jt represents a payroll tax on employers. These taxes are paid only by ﬁrms
operating in the formal sector. Hence τ fF t > 0, whereas τ
f
It = 0.
The ﬁrst order conditions (hereafter, FOCs) on vjt and ljt in the formal and informal
4Firms are owned by households and uC,t is the marginal utility of consumption. This ensures that ﬁrst
order conditions are measured in the same units.
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sector are respectively:
κj
qjt
= Et [βt,t+1µjt+1] (2.18)
µjt = ϕjtZjt − wjt(1 + τ fjt) + Et [βt,t+1(1− λj)µjt+1] (2.19)
where µjt is the Lagrangian multiplier for labor adjustment and measures the current value
of an additional worker. Combining both FOCs leads to the job creation conditions in both
sectors:
κF
qFt
= Et
{
βt,t+1
[
(1− λF ) κF
qFt+1
+ ϕt+1ZFt+1 − wFt+1(1 + τ fF t+1)
]}
(2.20)
κI
qIt
= Et
{
βt,t+1
[
(1− λI) κI
qIt+1
+ ϕt+1ZIt+1 − wIt+1
]}
(2.21)
where βt,t+1 ≡ β uC,t+1uC,t is the one period ahead stochastic discount factor.
For both the formal and the informal sector, the job creation conditions state that, in
equilibrium, the vacancy creation cost incurred by the ﬁrm per current match is equal to the
expected discounted value of the vacancy creation cost per future match, further discounted
by the probability of current match survival 1− λ, plus the proﬁts from the match at time
t. Proﬁts from the match take into account the future marginal revenue product from the
match and its wage cost.
Wages Nominal wages are set through an individual Nash bargaining process. In each
t period and in both sectors J = F, I, the real value of an existing, productive match for
a producer, Jt, is the sum of the marginal product of the match (ϕtZjt) and the expected
discounted continuation value of the match (Etβt,t+1(1− λj)Jjt+1), net of the wage bill:
Jjt = ϕtZjt − wjt(1 + τ fjt) + Etβt,t+1(1− λj)Jjt+1 (2.22)
The worker's value of being matched, in both the formal and informal sector, is given by
the sum of real wage received and the expected discounted future value of being matched by
the ﬁrm:
Wjt =
(1− τwjt)
(1 + τ ct )
wjt + Et{βt,t+1[(1− λj)Wjt+1 + λjUu,t+1]} (2.23)
The expected future value of being matched by the ﬁrm (the last term on the r.h.s) is a
weighted average of probability 1 − λ that the match will survive or the probability λ that
the worker will become unemployed.
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The value of being unemployed is deﬁned as:
Ut =
bt
(1 + τ ct )
−ϑ e
1+%
Ft
1 + %
−ϑ e
1+%
It
1 + %
+Et{βt,t+1[ιFtWFt+1+ιItWIt+1+(1−ιFt−ιIt)Uu,t+1]} (2.24)
where ϑ
e1+%jt
1+%
is a convex search cost and % is the elasticity of disutility of searching. Therefore,
the value of being unemployed is the sum of unemployment beneﬁts5  net of search costs 
and the expected discounted future value of future states, where ιFt and ιIt are the probability
of becoming employed respectively in the formal or informal sector.
We deﬁne worker's surplus Hjt ≡ Wjt−Ut. The worker surplus in the formal and informal
sector is given by:
HFt =
(1− τwjt)
(1 + τ ct )
wjt −
(
bt
(1 + τ ct )
− ϑ e
1+%
Ft
1 + %
− ϑ e
1+%
It
1 + %
)
+ (1− λF − ιFt − ιIt)Et(βt,t+1HFt+1)
(2.25)
HIt =
wIt
(1 + τ ct )
−
(
bt
(1 + τ ct )
− ϑ e
1+%
Ft
1 + %
− ϑ e
1+%
It
1 + %
)
+(1−λI− ιFt− ιIt)Et(βt,t+1HIt+1) (2.26)
Nash bargaining maximizes the joint surplus JηjtH
1−η
jt with respect to wjt, where Hjt and
Jjt stand for surpluses respectively for workers and ﬁrms and the parameter η measures the
bargaining power of ﬁrms. The FOC implies:
ηHjt
∂Jjt
∂wjt
+ (1− η)Jjt∂Hjt
∂wjt
= 0 (2.27)
where ∂Jjt
∂wjt
= −(1 + τ fjt) and ∂Hjt∂wjt =
1−τwjt
1+τct
. Hence, the sharing rule can be rewritten in the
following form:
(1 + τ fjt)ηHjt =
1− τwjt
1 + τ ct
(1− η)Jjt (2.28)
The bargained wage satisﬁes the following condition, respectively in the formal and informal
5We assume that the informal sector does not allow the worker to be eligible for the unemployment
beneﬁts. Given that we have a representative unemployed worker, we set an average unemployment beneﬁts,
bt = lFt/(lFt + lIt)bWFt, where the parameter b is the replacement rate and measures beneﬁt generosity by
comparing unemployment beneﬁts received when not working to wages earned when employed.
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sector:
wFt =
η
1− τwFt
[
bt
(1 + τ ct )
− ϑ e
1+%
Ft
1 + %
− ϑ e
1+%
It
1 + %
]
+
1− η
1 + τ fF t
{
ϕtZFt + Et
[
βt,t+1JFt+1
(
(1− λF )− (1− λF − ιFt) 1 + τ
f
F t
1 + τ fF t+1
1− τwFt+1
1− τwFt
)]}
(2.29)
wIt = η
[
bt
(1 + τ ct )
− ϑ e
1+%
Ft
1 + %
− ϑ e
1+%
It
1 + %
]
+ (1− η) [ϕtZIt + ιItEt (βt,t+1JIt+1)] (2.30)
Wages are a linear combination  determined by the bargaining power parameter η  of
worker's outside option and the marginal revenue product generated by the worker plus the
expected discounted continuation value of the match to the ﬁrm. For high values of η, the
bargaining power of ﬁrms is higher and the portion of the net marginal revenue product and
continuation value to the ﬁrm appropriated by workers as wage payments is smaller, hence
the outside option becomes more relevant.
Optimal search intensities are given by ∂Ut/∂ejt = 0, which yields:
ϑe%jt =
∂ιjt
∂ejt
Et(βt,t+1Hjt+1) (2.31)
ϑe%Ft =
(
1− η
η
)
χF
(
VFt
eFtUt
)( 1− τwt+1
(1 + τ ft+1)(1 + τ
c
t+1)
)
κF
qFt
(2.32)
ϑe%It =
(
1− η
η
)
χI
(
VIt
eItUt
)(
1
1 + τ ct+1
)
κI
qIt
(2.33)
This set of equations shows that search eﬀorts are increasing in market tightness (Vjt/Ujt)
and decreasing in taxes. We deﬁne the tax wedge as TWFt =
1−τwt+1
(1+τft+1)(1+τ
c
t+1)
in the formal
sector and TWIt =
(
1
1+τct+1
)
in the informal sector. Equations above show that the higher the
tax wedge, the lower the search eﬀort. However, the tax wedge is not symmetrical between
sectors and hence the incentive to search for an informal job are reduced only by an increase
in the consumption tax, τ ct , but they are not aﬀected by changes in payroll taxes, τ
f
t and τ
w
t
.
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Final goods
In this subsection variables denoted by the letter d refer to a country's own goods consumed
or produced domestically, whereas x refers to quantities and prices of exports.
Producer i is a multi-product ﬁrm that produces a set of diﬀerentiated product varieties,
indexed by ω, y(ω, i), which is deﬁned over a continuum Ω:
Yt(i) =
(∫ ∞
ω∈Ω
yt(ω, i)
θ−1
θ dω
) θ
θ−1
(2.34)
where θ > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across varieties. To save notation,
from now on, we omit the index i, since consumption-producing sectors are symmetric in
the economy.
We deﬁne P yt , the cost of the product bundle Yt:
P yt =
(∫ ∞
ω∈Ω
pyt (ω)
1−θdω
) 1
1−θ
(2.35)
where pyt (ω) is the nominal marginal cost of producing variety ω.
To create a new variety ω, each retailer needs to create a new plant, facing a sunk
investment, fe,t, denominated in units of intermediate input. Each plant produces using
diﬀerent technologies indexed by relative productivity z(ω), which is drawn from a common
distribution G(z) with support on [zmin,∞). For the sake of simplicity, from now on we
omit ω. This relative productivity level remains ﬁxed thereafter. Productivity level of
foreign plants are drawn from an identical distribution. Each plant uses intermediate inputs
to produce its diﬀerentiated product variety, facing the real marginal cost:
ϕz,t ≡ p
y
t (z)
PT
=
ϕt
z
(2.36)
The number of products created and commercialized by each retailer is endogenous. At
each point in time, only a subset of varieties Ωt ⊂ Ω is actually available to consumers.
Therefore, at time t, each Home retailer commercializes Nd,t varieties and creates Ne,t new
products that will be available for sale at time t+ 1. New and incumbent plants can be hit
by a "death" shock with probability δ ∈ (0, 1) at the end of each period. The law of motion
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for the stock of producing plants is:
Nd,t+1 = (1− δ)(Nd,t +Ne,t) (2.37)
where δ is the ﬁrm's exit rate. When serving the foreign market, each retailer faces per-unit
iceberg trade costs, τt > 1, as well as ﬁxed export costs, fx,t paid for each exported product
and denominated in units of intermediate input. We deﬁne total ﬁxed costs f¯x,t = fx,tNx,t,
where Nx,t denotes the number of product varieties exported abroad. If ﬁxed export costs
are absent (f¯x,t = 0), each producer would ﬁnd it optimal to sell all its product varieties
both domestically and abroad. Fixed export costs imply that only varieties produced by
plants with suﬃciently high productivity (above a cutoﬀ level zx,t, determined below) are
exportable.
We deﬁne two special average productivity levels (weighted by relative output shares):
an average z˜d for all producing plants and an average z˜x,t for all exporting plants:
z˜d =
(∫ ∞
zmin
zθ−1dG(z)
) 1
θ−1
z˜x,t =
[
1
1−G(zx,t)
](∫ ∞
zx,t
zθ−1dG(z)
) 1
θ−1
We assume that G(·) is Pareto with shape parameter kp > θ−1.6 As a result, z˜d = κ 1θ−1 zmin
and z˜x,t = κ
1
θ−1 zx,t, where κ = kp/[kp − (θ − 1)]. The share of exporting plants is given by:
Nx,t = [1−G(zx,t)]Nd,t =
(
zmin
z˜x,t
)−kp
κ
kp
θ−1Nd,t (2.38)
The real costs of producing the bundles Yd,t and Yx,t are respectively:
P yd,t
Pt
= N
1
1−θ
d,t
ϕt
z˜d
,
P yx,t
Pt
= N
1
1−θ
x,t
ϕt
z˜x,t
(2.39)
The ﬁnal producer determines Nd,t+1 and the productivity cutoﬀ zx,t to minimize the
present discount value of costs:
∞∑
s=t
βt,s
[
P yd,s
Ps
Yd,s + τs
P yx,s
Ps
Yx,s +
(
Ns+1
1− δ −Ns
)
fe,sϕs +Nx,sfx,sϕs
]
(2.40)
6Hence, G(x) =
(
z
zmin
)−kp
.
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subject to (2.38), (2.39), and z˜x,t = κ
1
θ−1 zx,t.
The FOC with respect to zx,t yields:
τt
P yx,t
Pt
Yx,t
Nx,t
=
(θ − 1)kp
kp − (θ − 1)fx,tϕt (2.41)
In equilibrium, the marginal revenue from adding a variety with productivity zx,t to the
export bundle has to be equal to the ﬁxed cost. Thus, varieties produced by plants with
productivity below zx,t are distributed only in the domestic market. The composition of
the traded bundle is endogenous and the set of exported products ﬂuctuates over time with
changes in the proﬁtability of export.
The FOC with respect to Nd,t+1 determines product creation:
ϕtfe,t = (1− δ)βt,t+1
 ϕt+1 (fe,t+1 − Nx,t+1Nd,t+1 fx,t+1)
+ 1
θ−1
(
P yd,t+1
Pt+1
Yd,t+1
Nd,t+1
+ τt+1
P yx,t+1
Pt+1
Yx,t+1
Nx,t+1
Nx,t+1
Nd,t+1
)  (2.42)
In equilibrium, the cost of producing an additional variety, ϕtfe,t, must be equal to its
expected beneﬁt, which includes expected savings on future sunk investment costs augmented
by the marginal revenue from commercializing the variety, net of ﬁxed export costs, if it is
exported.
Domestic and export prices Let Pd,t and Px,t be the price of the product bundle Yd,t
and Yx,t. Each ﬁnal producer faces the following domestic and foreign demand for its product
bundles:
Yd,t =
(
Pd,t
Pt
)−φ
Y Ct , Yx,t =
(
Px,t
P ∗t
)−φ
Y C∗t (2.43)
where Y Ct and Y
C∗
t stand for aggregate demands of the consumption basket in the domestic
and foreign country. The elasticity of substitution across sectoral bundles for the aggregate
demand, φ > 1, is equal to the elasticity of substitution for the consumption basket, al-
though aggregate demand in each country includes sources other than consumption. This
assumption ensures that the consumption price index for the the consumption aggregator is
also the price index for aggregate demand of the basket.
We assume producer currency pricing (PCP): ﬁnal producers set the price of the product
bundle, Pd,t, and the the price of the export bundle, P hx,t, in their own domestic currency,
letting the price in the foreign market move with the nominal exchange rate, that is: Px,t =
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τP hx,t/St. Because of ﬁxed export costs, the composition of domestic and export bundles
is diﬀerent, and hence producers face diﬀerent marginal costs of producing these bundles.
Therefore ﬁnal producers set two diﬀerent prices for the Home and Foreign markets. The
optimal price for domestic sales and exported sales satisﬁes respectively:
Pd,t
Pt
=
φ
φ− 1
P yd,t
Pt
,
P hx,t
Pt
=
τt
Qt
φ
φ− 1
P yx,t
Pt
(2.44)
where Qt = StP ∗t /Pt is the real exchange rate.
We deﬁne the average price of a domestic variety, ρ˜d,t ≡ N
1
θ−1
d,t (Pd,t/Pt) and the average
price of an exported variety, ρ˜x,t ≡ N
1
θ−1
x,t (Px,t/P
∗
t ). Combining the equations (2.39) and
(2.44), we obtain the average price of a domestic and an exported variety, respectively
deﬁned as:
ρ˜d,t =
φ
φ− 1
ϕt
z˜d
, ρ˜x,t =
φ
φ− 1
τt
Qt
ϕt
z˜x,t
(2.45)
Finally, the average output of, respectively, a domestic and exported variety are deﬁned as:
y˜d,t = ρ˜
−φ
d,tN
θ−φ
1−θ
d,t Y
C
t , y˜x,t = ρ˜
−φ
x,tN
θ−φ
1−θ
x,t Y
C∗
t (2.46)
2.2.3 Government
In each period, we assume that government spending and unemployment beneﬁts are funded
by taxation on consumption and wage income:
Gt = τ
c
t
[
ωCat + (1− ω)(CFt + CIt + Cut )
]
+ (τwt + τ
f
t )w
F
t lFt − btUt (2.47)
2.2.4 Closing conditions
Aggregate demand is the sum of private and public consumption and is deﬁned as:
Y Ct = ωCat + (1− ω)(CFt + CZIt+ Cut) + κFVFt + κIVIt +Gt (2.48)
We assume that he cost of opening new vacancies are socially shared.
Assets are in zero net supply, which implies the equilibrium condition:
at+1 + a
∗
t+1 = 0 (2.49)
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Net foreign assets are determined by:
(at+1 − at) +Qt(a∗t+1 − a∗t ) = itat +Qti∗ta∗t +
(
QtNx,tρ˜x,ty˜x,t −N∗x,tρ˜∗x,ty˜∗x,t
)
(2.50)
where the last term in brackets represents the trade balance: TBt = QtNx,tρ˜x,ty˜x,t −
N∗x,tρ˜
∗
x,ty˜
∗
x,t.
2.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model using quarterly data from the U.S. and Brazilian economy. We believe
that Brazil is an illustrative example of an emerging countries which, starting form high level
of informality in the late 1990s, has adopted a set of policy initiative to facilitate the move
to formality. A ﬁrst program, called SIMPLES, was launched in 1996 and was followed by
a second one, the SUPERSIMPLES program, in 2006. Since, in Brazil there is a strong
correlation between size of company and prevalence of informality, these programs aimed at
reducing the costs of formalization through a reduction of tax rates and tax regulations for
Brazilian micro ﬁrms with no more than ﬁve paid employees. Since the SUPERSIMPLES
came into force in July 2007, some 9 million businesses have joined this system of taxation.7
In this section we discuss the calibration strategy. Broadly speaking, we choose some
parameter values from the literature, while other parameters are set so to match macroeco-
nomic series observed for the United States and Brazil. We assume that the two countries are
asymmetric, hence some parameters describing labor and goods markets may diﬀer across
countries. Table 2.1 summarizes the asymmetric calibration.
We set the discount factor β to 0.99, implying that the annual real interest rate is 4
percent. The value of the risk aversion parameter, γc, is equal to 2. Following Bernard
et al. (2003), we set the elasticity of substitution across product varieties, θ, equal to 3.8.
Following Ghironi & Melitz (2005), we set the elasticity of substitution across Home and
Foreign goods, φ, equal to θ, and the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity kp equal to 3.4. We
normalize zmin to 1. We set iceberg trade costs τ equal to 1.7, following the estimates of
trade costs reported by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003). We calibrate the ﬁxed export
costs fx so that the shares of exporting plants in the developed and emerging country are
respectively equal to 21 percent and 18 percent, consistently with data reported in Bernard
7See ILO (2015) for a discussion and an evaluation of some programs launched in emerging countries to
move to formalization.
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et al. (2003) for the United States and in the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Brazil.8 To
ensure steady-state determinacy stationarity of net foreign assets, we set the parameter ψ
measuring asset adjustment costs equal to 0.0025 as in Ghironi & Melitz (2005). Following
Ebell & Haefke (2009), we set entry costs, fe, so that regulation costs amount to 5.2 months
of per capita output. To pin down the ﬁrm exit rate δ, we target the portion of worker
separation due to ﬁrm exit equal to 30 percent in the United States and to 37 percent in
Brazil: these values fall within the range of estimates reported by Haltiwanger et al. (2006).
Empirical evidence indicates that informal ﬁrms are less productive than formal ones.
Regarding the parameters speciﬁc to the search and matching framework, the gross re-
placement rate for unemployment beneﬁts b in the formal sector is set to 13 percent for
the United States and 15.2 percent for Brazil. The parameter measuring ﬁrms' bargaining
power, η, is equal to 0.4, as estimated by Flinn (2006). The elasticity of the matching func-
tion ε is equal to 0.4, so that it falls within the range of estimates reported by Petrongolo &
Pissarides (2008) and the Hosios condition holds. We set the costs of vacancy posting (κF
and κI), matching eﬃciency (χF and χI) and exogenous separation rate (λF and λI) in the
formal and informal sectors so to match the underlying structure of the two countries, with
the values of steady-state ratios summarized in Table 2.1. We choose a calibration based
on the long-run averages (1992-2017) from ILO data. Steady-state unemployment rates are
respectively 6 percent and 8.7 percent in the United States and Brazil, while the ratio of
informal employment to total employment is respectively 7 percent and 30 percent in the
United States and Brazil.9 This calibration yields an informal wage gap (i.e. diﬀerence be-
tween wages for formal and informal workers) equal to 66 percent in the United States and
11 percent in Brazil. This latter value is very close to estimates in Bargain & Kwenda (2014)
and Bargain & Magejo (2010) who conclude that earning diﬀerentials driven by the informal
wage penalties are quite modest in Brazil and remain below 10 percent all along the distri-
bution. Labor market regulations and high employer costs attached to formal employment
in Brazil may simultaneously explain the large extent of informal work and the relatively
modest informal wage gap. Firms tend to recoup high employers' payroll taxes paid to hire
formal workers, which could partly explain low informal wage gaps. In Brazil informal wage
penalties may only partly be related to the ﬁrm size eﬀect, since many informal workers are
to be found in large formal ﬁrms.
8As a caveat, we point out that the World Bank Enterprise Survey covers only ﬁrms of the formal private
sector with ﬁve or more employees. Hence informal and micro ﬁrms are excluded from the sample.
9We use vulnerable employment as a proxy for informal employment.
63
Finally, we set the initial value of tax rates at their respective steady-state levels. The
United States employs a retail sales tax rather than a value added tax (VAT) as the principal
consumption tax. The retail sales tax in the United States is not a federal, but it is a tax
imposed at the state and local government levels. The total tax rate ranges between 0 percent
(e.g. in Delaware, Oregon, New Hampshire, Montana) and 13.5 percent (in Alabama). We
decide to set τ c for the United States at the average rate, 7.8 percent. Brazil operates a
multiple rate system with ICMS (Imposto de Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços) tax
levied at a state level. The standard state rate of ICMS is 17 percent (18 percent in São
Paulo, Minas Gerais and Paraná and 19 percent in Rio de Janeiro). Therefore, for Brazil we
set τ c equal to 17 percent. The personal income tax rate ranges between 0 percent and 37
percent in the United States and between 0 percent and 27.5 percent in Brazil. We choose
the average value of the personal income tax rate and we set τw equal to 18 percent for
the USA and 14 percent for Brazil. In the United States, the social security tax rate in
12.4 percent (6.2 percent on employees and 6.2 percent on employers). On top, there is a
tax of 2.9 percent (half imposed on employer and half withheld from the employee's pay) of
all wages for Medicare. In Brazil, the employer's contribution is determined at the rate of
approximately 20 percent of salary to be paid to the National Institute of Social Security
(Instituto Nacional do Seguro Nacional, INSS). On top, the FGTS is the Fundo de Garantia
por Tempo de Serviço which is the Employee Indemnity Guarantee Fund and an employee
compulsory fund. All Companies are obligated to deposit the FGTS contribution into their
employers account. The tax corresponds to an 8 percent rate on top of the gross salary.
Since in our model we consider only the share of payroll taxes paid by employers, we set the
steady-state payroll tax rate, τ f equal to 7.65 percent for the US and 28 percent for Brazil.
64
Table 2.1: Calibration
Targets and parameters Notation Developed Emerging Source
Calibration targets
Formal employment lF /(lF + lI) 93% 70% ILO, Trends Econometric Models
Informal employment lI/(lF + lI) 7% 30% ILO, Trends Econometric Models
Unemployment rate U 6% 8.7% ILO, Trends Econometric Models
Share of exporting ﬁrms Nx/Nd 21% 18% World Bank and Bernard et al. (2003)
Final good Market
Sunk entry costs fe 0.4 0.4 Ebell and Haefke (2009)
Fixed export costs fx 0.0062 0.0090 Calibration targets
Iceberg trade costs τ 1.7 1.7 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
Pareto shape κp 3.4 3.4 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
Plant exit δ 0.026 0.026 Haltiwanger et al. (2008)
Elasticity of substitution θ = φ 3.8 3.8 Bernard et al. (2003)
Taxation
Consumption tax τ c 7.8% 17%
Income tax τwF (τ
w
I ) 18% (0%) 14% (0%)
Payroll tax τfF (τ
f
I ) 7.65% (0%) 28% (0%)
Labor market
Bargaining power η 0.4 0.4 Flinn (2006)
Matching function elasticity ε 0.4 0.4 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2006)
Vacancy costs, formal κF 2.5 2.5 Calibration targets
Vacancy costs, informal κI 1.5 1.5 Calibration targets
Matching eﬃciency, formal χF 0.30 0.28 Calibration targets
Matching eﬃciency, informal χI 0.35 0.38 Calibration targets
Separation rate, formal λF 0.032 0.055 Calibration targets
Separation rate, informal λI 0.27 0.15
Disutility of search, scale ϑ 2 2
Disutility of search, elasticity % 1.3 1.3
Unemployment beneﬁts, formal b 13 15.2 Aleksynska and Schindler (2011)
Other parameters
Risk aversion γc 2 2
Discount factor β 0.99 0.99
Bond adjustment cost ψ 0.0025 0.0025 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
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2.4 The impact of trade liberalization
We use the model to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on employment in both
developed and emerging countries. World trade liberalization is captured by a reduction in
ﬁxed export costs in both countries.
Trade liberalization is modeled in the following way: in a ﬁrst phase, the "Home" country,
which is the developed country, cuts its per-unit iceberg trade costs (τt). This process starts
at the beginning of the simulation period and ends 70 quarters later (17.5 years). The cut
in iceberg trade costs gives a competitive advantage to the developed country. In a second
phase, which starts 5 years later (i.e. 20 quarters), the emerging country experiments the
same decline in its own iceberg costs. Hence, 22.5 years after the initial reduction of trade
costs observed in the developed country, iceberg costs in the developing country will have
converged to those observed in the developed country. At this third phase, the two countries
beneﬁt from the same reduction in trade costs and trade liberalization becomes symmetrical.
For the sake of clarity, we ﬁrst analyze the dynamics in the developed country and then in
the emerging country. We discuss the dynamics both in the short term, i.e. before than the
emerging country beneﬁts from trade liberalization, and in the medium to long term, i.e.
when both countries can take advantage for the trade cost reductions.
The short-run adjustment on the goods markets. In the ﬁrst phase of trade liber-
alization, i.e. when the developed country cuts its trade costs but the emerging country
still does not beneﬁt from new technologies allowing it to reduce its trade costs, lower trade
costs allow exporters to have higher proﬁts in the developed country. Trade translates into
increased proﬁtable opportunities for exporting ﬁrms, which induces more ﬁrms to enter the
export market. These ﬁrms face lower costs and hence increase their labor demand, which
ultimately leads to higher real wage. This, in turn, brings down the proﬁts of the least pro-
ductive ﬁrms such that the ﬁrm entries are reduced. Notice that these low productive ﬁrms
produce only for the domestic market. Hence as it is shown in the Figure 2.1, the number
of ﬁrms in the developed country declines, but at the same time, the number of exporters in
this country increase (the export-cutoﬀ decreases). Indeed, a higher proportion of exporting
ﬁrms in the developed country leads to higher average quality of goods.
In the developed country, at each period, domestic market prices (ρd,t in the model
notation and "Price in H - H" in the ﬁgures) and export prices (ρx,t in the model notation
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Figure 2.1: The ﬁnal good sector
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Note: H and F indicate respectively the Home country (i.e. the developed country) which is represented
by a solid line and the Foreign country (i.e. the emerging country) which is represented by a dotted line.
The blue lines display the dynamics with only trade liberalization, and the red lines display the dynamics
when the tax reform is implemented.
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and "Price in F - H" in the ﬁgures) are given by the following equations:
ρd,t =
φ
φ− 1
ϕt
z˜d
ρx,t =
τt
Qt
φ
φ− 1
ϕt
z˜x,t
Hence, the increase in input prices, ϕt, generated by the expansion in ﬁnal good producers'
demand explains the rise in domestic market prices ρd,t. On the other hand, export prices
ρx,t drops as trade liberalization, through the decline in trade costs τt, compensates the
increase in input prices as well as the decline in productivity (z˜x,t) of export ﬁrms. Finally,
lower iceberg costs in the developed country leads to a decline in the real exchange rate (Qt)
underlining the gains in competitiveness of this country.
In the short run, the emerging economy does not observe a decline of trade costs. Instead,
higher home prices in the developed country, combined with the decrease in the real exchange
rate, lead consumers in the developed country to redirect their demand toward their trade
partner. This increase in demand addressed to emerging economy motivates more exporting
ﬁrms in this area. This, in turn, leads to a rise in input demand, and thus to a rise in the
production costs (see Figure 2.1). As a consequence, input demand and production costs
increase, which ultimately reduce the number of new ﬁrms entries: the number of ﬁrms
(Nf = "Domestic producers - F") declines in the emerging country (see Figure 2.1).
Indeed, in the emerging country, at each period, the price of domestic goods (ρ∗d,t and
"Price in H - F" in the ﬁgures) and the price of exported goods (ρ∗x,t and "Price in F - F" in
the ﬁgures) are modeled as in the developed economy, in a symmetric way:
ρ∗d,t =
φ
φ− 1
ϕ∗t
z˜∗d
ρ∗x,t = τtQt
φ
φ− 1
ϕ∗t
z˜∗x,t
It is clear that the rise of input price causes the rise in the domestic price (ρ∗d). The increase
of the input price (ϕ∗) as well as the decline of productivity of exporters (z˜∗x) raises the
export price, even though the real exchange rate (Q) declines.
The short-run adjustment on the labor markets. In the developed contry, higher
input prices for ﬁnal producers translate into higher marginal revenues for the intermediate
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good producers, and ultimately into higher wages. Figure 2.2 shows that labor demand
increase in both the formal and the informal sector, driven by the increase in the price of
intermediate goods sold to ﬁnal producers. A part of this increase in the job surplus is
redistributed to workers via wage increases. Figure 2.2 shows that wages increase in both
the formal and the informal sector. Given that these wage increases are driven by the rise in
the price of intermediate goods in both sectors (more demand must be satisﬁed by the ﬁnal
goods producers, leading to an increase of intermediate goods demands), they are similar
across the formal and the informal sector and thus wage inequalities remain stable.
Although employment increases in both sectors, in the informal sector the increase is
relatively larger, due to lower labor costs, which ensures that more job vacancies are opened
in the informal sector. Indeed, expanded job creation in the informal sector encourages
unemployed agents to search for a job more intensively in this sector, thus reinforcing the
sector's advantage in the hiring process (see Figure 2.3). On the one side, at the beginning
of the process trade liberalization induces higher informality in the developed country. On
the other side it also induces a reduction in unemployment (see Figure 2.3).
Tightness on labor market increases in the emerging country, although for reasons diﬀer-
ent from those observed in the developed country, and consequently employment and wage
rise. As in the developed country, lower labor costs in the informal sector favor this sector
during the expansion (see Figure 2.2). Moreover, unemployment declines, while the share of
informality goes up (see Figure 2.3). Note that the rise in informality is of small amplitude
in the emerging economy. This is due to the initial share of informal employment. As the
emerging economy has a larger share of informality, it causes a more negative congestion
eﬀect: the job ﬁlling rate falls more rapidly with vacancy postings. Hence, this curbs job
openings in the informal sector.
The medium to long-run adjustments on the goods markets. In the medium run,
trade liberalization also aﬀects the emerging country, where iceberg costs also decline, al-
though with a delay. Hence, higher ﬁrms' proﬁts worldwide boost income and labor demand
leading to higher wages. The increase in labor costs leads both economies to be more se-
lective: the number of ﬁrms declines, but the share of exporting ﬁrms, which are more
productive, increases (see Figure 2.1). The larger participation of the emerging country to
the world trade stabilizes export prices in the developed country: the real exchange rate is
more stable and the bias cost in favor of the developed country slows down (see Figure 2.1).
In the emerging economy, in the medium run, trade liberalization ultimately induces
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Figure 2.2: The labor market
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the red lines display the dynamics when the tax reform is implemented.
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Figure 2.3: Unemployment
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country (i.e. the emerging country). The blue lines display the dynamics with only trade liberalization, and
the red lines display the dynamics when the tax reform is implemented.
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more ﬁrms to export, thereby increasing labor demand and real wages. As in the developed
economy, this leads to high share of exporters and informality in emerging economy.
In the long run, when the developed country has reached its long-run level of iceberg costs,
in the emerging country trade expansion is still ongoing. In the emerging country, revenue
growth is now driven by iceberg cost reduction which takes place only in the emerging country
and still generates growth gains. Growth gains, in this phase, are obviously more modest
than during the ﬁrst phase of trade expansion. However, the emerging country still beneﬁts
from decreasing iceberg costs. Hence, its competitiveness is restored and the real exchange
rate increases (see Figure 2.1).
The medium to long-run adjustments on the labor markets. In the medium run,
the increasing participation of both countries in the world trade, by increasing incomes and
thus the demand for goods, boosts labor demand (see Figure 2.2) and reduces unemployment
(see Figure 2.3).
In the long run, when trade costs drop only in the emerging country, income growth
generated by new exports is marginal: employment gains become smaller and smaller in
both countries (i.e. developed and emerging) and both sectors (i.e. formal and informal).
When iceberg costs converge to their long-term levels in both countries, variables converge
towards the new steady-state levels. This phase is characterized by an over-adjustment,
which is the result of vacancy-posting strategies adopted by ﬁrms (see Figure 2.2). As
long as proﬁt opportunities grow, there are strong incentives to post vacancies to beneﬁt
from growth. This competition leads ﬁrms to over-hiring. Once growth falters, employment
starts decreasing through the exogenous rate of destruction and the slowdown in new job
opportunities. This process takes time and explains why, after the strong employment gains
recorded during the period of trade expansion, both countries enter a phase characterized
by a contraction on the labor market (see Figure 2.2). Since the separation rate is higher
in the informal sector than in the formal sector, this decline in employment is faster in the
informal sector, which explains the rise in the share of formal employment in this phase of
the long-term adjustment (see Figure 2.2).
2.5 Tax reform
In order to reduce the increasing incidence of informality induced by trade liberalization,
both countries should introduce incentives to develop businesses in the formal economy.
72
An easy way to promote formal employment is to reduce the payroll tax paid by ﬁrms.
Nevertheless, the cost of this policy is a reduction of government budget, and thus a cut
in public expenditures on social security. An alternative solution might be implementing a
budget-neutral tax reform, consisting in increasing the consumption tax to fund the cut in
payroll taxes. An advantage of this strategy is that the consumption tax has a larger base,
it is easier to collect and more diﬃcult to evade. This policy mix, called "social VAT", has
been implemented in many European countries in the recent years, for instance in Denmark
in 1988, in Sweden in 1993, in Germany in 2006 and in France in 2012.
In the rest of the paper, the tax reform is implemented in both countries at the beginning
of their respective trade liberalization process. The tax reform is country-speciﬁc. We
calibrate the tax reform as follows: (i) the reform is budget-neutral and (ii) the initial and
the ﬁnal levels of informality in both countries are the same. Given these constraints, the
payroll tax is reduced from 8.0 percent to 5.8 percent with an increase in the consumption tax
from 8 percent to 9.8 percent in the developed countries, whereas in the emerging country, the
payroll tax is reduced from 28.0 percent to 24.0 percent with an increase in the consumption
tax from 17.0 percent to 18.8 percent.
The impact on ﬁnal goods sector. Figure 2.1 depicts the eﬀects of trade liberalization
in the ﬁnal good sector when the government implements a budget-neutral tax reform. This
scenario is represented by the red solid lines. Taxation has no direct impact on the behavior
of ﬁnal goods producers. The comparison with the pre-reform scenario (represented by the
blue dotted lines in Figure 2.1) points out that the dynamics of variables in the ﬁnal good
sector remain unchanged because the main driver of both short-run and long-run changes in
productivity and prices is trade liberalization. The tax reform only aﬀects the distribution
of jobs, across the formal and informal sector leaving the aggregate demand of intermediate
goods unchanged.10 This is due to the ambiguous eﬀect of a budget-neutral tax reform on
the tax wedge: on the one hand, it reduces the tax wedge by lowering the taxes paid by the
employers, on the other hand it increases it by increasing the tax on consumption.
The impact on labor markets. Figure 2.2 reports the eﬀects of trade liberalization on
labor markets when the government implements a budget-neutral tax reform. This scenario
is represented by the red solid lines. Recall that wages in both sectors are determined by
10To be more precise, changes in tax rates alter the equilibrium level of the production of intermediate
goods. However, these changes have a second-order magnitude.
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the following equations:
wFt =
η
1− τwF0
(
b
(1 + τ c1)
− ϑ e
1+%
Ft
1 + %
− ϑ e
1+%
It
1 + %
)
+
1− η
1 + τ fF1
(
ϕtZFt + κF
ιF
qFt
)
wIt = η
(
b
(1 + τ c1)
− ϑ e
1+%
Ft
1 + %
− ϑ e
1+%
It
1 + %
)
+ (1− η)
(
ϕtZIt + κI
ιIt
qIt
)
where τwF0 is the tax paid by employees before the reform (indexed by 0). This tax rate
remains unchanged, while the payroll tax paid by employers and the consumption tax jump
instantaneously to their new post-reform values (respectively τ fF1 and τ
c
1):
As observed for the baseline simulation without the tax reform (Figure 2.2, blue dotted
lines), wages increase in both sectors. However, when the tax reform is implemented, the
increase in wages is more remarkable in the formal sector than in informal sector (Figure 2.2).
As a consequence, the wage gap between formal and informal workers is getting wider. Figure
2.4 shows that, before the tax reform, wages in the formal sector was 66.0 percent larger than
in informal sector in the advanced economy and 11.0 percent in the emerging country (see
blues dotted lines). After the reform, this gap rises to 69.0 percent in the advanced economy
and to 14.5 percent in the emerging country (see solid red lines). Widening wage gaps across
the two sectors stem from the reduction of tax wedges, leading to a larger job surplus and
thus higher wages. The tax reform also changes the sharing rule between ﬁrms and workers,
at the advantage of the workers. The underlying mechanism is due to two channels: on the
one hand, the drop in the tax paid by employers increases the share of productivity paid
to employees in the formal sector. On the other hand, the increase in the consumption tax
reduces the disposable wage. However, this moderation is proportional to the weight of the
unemployment beneﬁts in the wage: as it is weak for workers in the formal sector, this wage
moderation induced by the increase of the consumption tax is of small amplitude for the
formal sector. The ﬁrst channel clearly dominates and leads to wage increases in the formal
sector after the tax reform.
Given that the search eﬀort is endogenous, the tax reform also changes the reservation
wage of the workers. Indeed, the cut in payroll taxes stimulates ﬁrms to open new vacancies,
which increase the chance for unemployed workers to ﬁnd a job in the formal sector. The
optimistic job prospects in the formal sector encourage the unemployed to focus their search
eﬀorts more on this sector. Search eﬀorts increase in the formal sector and decline in the
informal sector (see Figure 2.3, red solid lines). Hence, the tax reform ultimately redirects
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the labor force toward formal employment.11 Figure 2.3 shows that the tax reform reduces
the search eﬀort relatively to the benchmark scenario (i.e. trade liberalization without the
tax reform, represented by the blue dotted lines), explaining the increase in the reservation
wage, and thus the rise in the wages.
Figure 2.3 shows that, following the tax reform, unemployment increases on impact and
in the short-run. The underlying reason is that beneﬁts from trade liberalization are gradual,
while the tax reform is immediate: given the lack of attractiveness of the informal sector,
search eﬀorts  devoted to ﬁnd a job in the informal sector before the implementation of
the tax reform  now decrease, leading to an increase of unemployment in the short run
(see Figure 2.3, red solid lines). At the beginning of the trade liberalization process, the
marginal value of intermediate goods and workers' productivity, although higher, are not
large enough to absorb the excess of unemployed workers who stop searching for an informal
job. This explains why unemployment increases on impact and in the short-term especially
in the emerging country, where the incidence of informality is higher than in the advanced
economy.
Inequalities and welfare. Figure 2.4 shows that trade liberalization allows workers to
reach higher welfare, regardless of the labor market status. Not surprisingly, welfare gains
are higher for workers occupied in the informal sector. The underlying reason is that trade
liberalization favors employment in the informal sector where ﬁrms open more jobs, wages
increase leading to higher welfare gains for informal workers. This result has to be interpreted
with some caveats. The initial welfare of the workers occupied in the informal sector is
largely lower than the welfare of those occupied in the formal sector. Hence, following trade
liberalization a larger share of workers suﬀer from poor working conditions associated to
informality, although trade liberalization slightly reduces the welfare gap between formal
and informal workers. When the tax reform is introduced, in both countries welfare gains
for workers employed in the formal sector increase signiﬁcantly (see Figure 2.4). This is
mainly due to the large initial jump in wages in the formal sectors. Conversely, welfare
associated to the outside options (i.e. unemployment or a job in the informal sector) are
lower than those observed in the baseline scenario (i.e. trade liberalization without tax
11Similar conclusions are drawn in Antón who analyzes the eﬀects of the 2012 tax reform in Colombia.
He suggests that the reform would increase total employment by between 0.3 to 0.5 percent and formal
employment by between 3.4 to 3.7 percent over the pre-reform scenario. In Brazil, tax cuts for small ﬁrms
introduced by the reforms in 1996 and 2006 have led more than 9 millions of businesses into the formal
sector.
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Figure 2.4: Wage inequality and welfare
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reform). This comes as no surprise, since the reduction in the welfare of workers employed
in the informal sector is the corollary to the decline of informal employment share: only
reduction in the welfare of this workers type allows labor market to reallocate toward the
formal sector. The most important point is certainly the fact that the tax reform allows
the welfare of the unemployed workers to increase, despite the large initial loses induced by
the jump in the consumption tax (see Figure 2.4). These welfare gains for the unemployed
workers are larger in the emerging country because more unemployed workers are eligible for
the unemployment beneﬁts following the tax reform.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that trade liberalization boosts economic activity in both developed
and emerging countries. However, we ﬁnd that trade liberalization is associated to higher
informality, which ultimately implies less job security and lower employment quality.
Policy makers should consider placing a high priority on promoting job quality and
income equality. Policy interventions to curb informality should follow a comprehensive
approach that rests on three pillars: increasing the beneﬁts of formality, decreasing the costs
of formalization and improving enforcement methods. In this respect, we investigate whether
taxations may smooth the way for formalization of jobs. To this purpose, we extend the
Melitz (2003) model and develop a two-country DSGE model, featuring a developed and
emerging (or developing) country as in Cacciatore & Ghironi (2014). In addition, we embed
the tax system and the informal labor sector in the model with the aim to analyze whether
taxation may correct the bias toward informality introduced by trade liberalization. We
argue that a ﬁscal reform can mitigate these adverse eﬀects of trade on labor market. A
Social VAT, switching the tax burden from payroll taxes paid by ﬁrms in the formal sector
to the consumption tax, can increase the incentives to operate in the formal sector. However,
this comes at the cost of widening income disparities.
Of course, we acknowledge that a tax reform alone is not suﬃcient to reduce the incidence
of low-quality jobs. Tax policy interventions should go hand in hand with more eﬀective
social protection systems and labor laws. Extending unemployment beneﬁts to all workers
in the formal sector including those working part-time and/or on temporary contracts, could
prevent unemployed from looking for an informal job. Another step to enhance the quality of
existing jobs is intensifying labor inspections in those sector where the incidence of informal
work is higher.
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Appendix
A Dynare equations
To solve the model, we use the Dynare software (see Adjemian et al. (2011)). After solving
the steady state of the model, we use the following equation set in order to obtain the
equilibrium paths.
• The equilibrium price index
1 = ρ˜1−θd,t N
1−φ
1−θ
d,t + ρ˜
∗1−θ
x,t N
∗ 1−φ
1−θ
x,t
• Average export productivity
ρ˜−θx,tN
θ−φ
1−θ
x,t Y
C∗
t =
θ − 1
kp − (θ − 1)
z˜x,t
τt
fx,t
• Labor market clearing
ZF lFt + ZI lIt = Nd,t
y˜d,t
z˜d
+Nx,t
y˜x,t
z˜x,t
τt +Ne,tfe,t +Nx,tfx,t
• Law of motion of employment
ljt = (1− λj)ljt−1 + qjt−1Vjt−1
• New variety (product) creation
1 = (1− δ)βEt
C−γct+1
C−γct
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
ρ˜d,t+1
ρ˜d,t
 fe,t+1fe,t − Nx,t+1Nd,t+1 fx,t+1fe,t
+ 1
(θ−1)fe,t
(
y˜d,t+1
z˜d
+ Nx,t+1
Nd,t+1
τt+1
z˜x,t+1
y˜x,t+1
) 
• Job creation
1 = βEt
{
C−γct+1
C−γct
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
(1− λj) qjt
qjt+1
+
qjt
κj
(
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• Wage determination
wFt =
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• Search intensity
ϑe%Ft =
(
1− η
η
)
χF
(
VFt
eFtUt
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(1 + τ ft+1)(1 + τ
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)
κF
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η
)
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eItUt
)(
1
1 + τ ct+1
)
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• Euler equation for domestic bond holding
(1 + ψat+1) = (1 + it+1)βEt
(
C−γcat+1
C−γcat
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
• Euler equation for foreign bond holding
(1 + ψa∗t+1) = (1 + i
∗
t+1)βEt
(
C−γcat+1
C−γcat
Qt+1
Qt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
• Bond market clearing
at+1 + a
∗
t+1 = 0
• Net foreign assets
(at+1 − at) +Qt(a∗t+1 − a∗t ) = itat +Qti∗ta∗t +QtNx,tρ˜x,ty˜x,t −N∗x,tρ˜∗x,ty˜∗x,t
• Law of motion for the stock of producing plants
Nd,t+1 = (1− δ)(Nd,t +Ne,t)
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• Share of exporting plants
Nx,t =
(
zmin
z˜x,t
)kp
α
kp
θ−1Nd,t
• Export productivity cutoﬀ
z˜x,t = α
1
θ−1 zx,t
• Average price of a domestic variety
ρ˜d,t =
φ
φ− 1
ϕt
z˜d
• Average price of an exported variety
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φ
φ− 1
τt
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ϕt
z˜x,t
• Average output of a domestic variety
y˜d,t = ρ˜
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• Average output of an exported variety
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• Aggregate demand
Y Ct = ωCat + (1− ω)(CFt + CZIt+ Cut) + κFVFt + κIVIt +Gt
• Formal workers' consumption
CFt = wFt lFt
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
• Unemployed agents' consumption
Cut =
bt(1− lt)
1 + τ ct
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• Informal workers' consumption
CIt = wIt
lIt
1 + τ ct
• Total consumption
Ct = ωCat + (1− ω)(CFt + CIt + Cut)
• Unemployment
Ut = 1− lFt − lIt
• Job ﬁlling rate
qjt = χj
(
ejtUt
Vjt
)1−ε
• Job ﬁnding rate
ιjt = χj
(
Vjt
ejtUt
)ε
ejt
• Productivity shock
logZjt = φ
Z1 logZjt−1 + φZ2 logZ∗jt−1 + 
Z
jt
• Government spending
Gt = τ
c
t [ωCat + (1− ω)(CFt + CIt + Cut)] + (τwt + τ ft ) wFt lFt − btUt
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B Initial and ﬁnal steady states
Figure 2.5: Goods markets
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Figure 2.6: Labor markets
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Figure 2.7: Unemployment
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Chapter 3
The Role of Labor Market Institutions in
the Transmission of Uncertainty Shocks
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3.1 Introduction
Since the work by Bloom (2009), uncertainty about the future course of the economy has
been identiﬁed as a possible driving force behind business cycle ﬂuctuations. A number
of recent papers have shown that an increase in uncertainty leads to a drop in economic
activity: output, investment, consumption, and employment.1 However, most of the analysis
studies the impact of uncertainty shocks in single-country analysis and cross-country evidence
focusing on the labor market is still scarce.2
This paper investigates heterogeneity on the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks to labor mar-
kets across 30 OECD countries. Using country-speciﬁc VARs, I ﬁnd that a sudden rise in
uncertainty lowers output and increases unemployment. More importantly, however, there
is substantial cross-country heterogeneity on the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks. Why do some
countries suﬀer severe rises in unemployment following an uncertainty shock? What can
account for the cross-country diﬀerences in responses? There are a number of candidate
channels that are available to account for the heterogeneity in responses: labor market in-
stitutions (LMIs), ﬁnancial frictions, regulatory framework, etc. In particular, this paper
focuses on the role of LMIs and explores how it can aﬀect the responses of labor market to
an uncertainty shock.
The labor market is a central institution in any modern economy, and it is characterized
by pervasive regulation. Across nations, the labor market is subject to minimum wages,
hiring and ﬁring restrictions, compulsory collective bargaining and arbitrage, limitations
on the number of hours, etc. Moreover, these LMIs vary across countries. Exploring the
cross-sectional dimension by comparing diﬀerences across country groups, I provide evidence
that heterogeneity in reactions of unemployment can be related to diﬀerential employment
protection legislation (EPL), among others. The impact of an uncertainty shock visibly
diﬀers between the two subgroups (low EPL vs. high EPL). Following an uncertainty shock,
countries with low EPL suﬀer higher rise in unemployment, take longer to recover to their
pre-shock trend, and do not display a subsequent over-adjustment. On the other hand,
high EPL countries present the modest and short-lived increase in unemployment, which is
subsequently compensated for.
The economic mechanism I study is the following. When uncertainty hits the economy,
the drops in real activity reduces labor demand. Firms should adjust their workforce by
1Related contributions include Alexopoulos & Cohen (2009), Bachmann et al. (2013), Caggiano et al.
(2014), Leduc & Liu (2016), Riegler (2015), Guglielminetti (2016) and Oh & Sopraseuth (2017).
2Carriére-Swallow & Cépedes (2013), Gourio et al. (2013), and Bhattarai et al. (2016)
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hiring less and laying oﬀ more. In theory, when ﬁring costs are higher, ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier
and cheaper to absorb shocks by keeping workers. This mechanism is in line with the ﬁrst
moment shock. However, the second moment shock reinforces this mechanism through the
real options channel. In periods of high uncertainty, ﬁring costs which have larger ﬁxed
component come with a bigger cost, as it would be costly to hire new workers when pro-
ductivity reverts quickly. Under irreversibility and uncertanty, ﬁrms become more cautious
to lay workers oﬀ and separation margin is more important on business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Hence, EPL, which is closely related to ﬁxed costs of ﬁring, might be a key parameter to
explaining the heterogenous responses in unemployment rate. High EPL (thereby incurring
high non-convex ﬁring cost) increases the option value of waiting more, reduces separations,
and mitigates the rise in unemployment.
This paper is related to a number of recent studies that examine the impact of uncertainty
shocks from a cross-country perspective. Bachmann et al. (2013) ﬁnd that surprise increase
in uncertainty have more persistent negative eﬀects on economic activity in the US than in
Germany. In particular, Germany features "wait and see" dynamics, whereas the evidence
for "wait and see" eﬀects in the US is mixed. They argue that "wait and see' dynamics
might be an important driving force in Germany because of frictions to adjusting labor.
Gourio et al. (2013) show that a group of G7 countries presents a similar negative eﬀect on
unemployment, and there is some heterogeneity. However, they do not document what can
cause heterogeneity. Carriére-Swallow & Cépedes (2013), which constitute key motivation
for this paper, ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in reactions of investment and consumption to
uncertainty shocks across 40 countries. In comparison to developed countries, emerging mar-
ket economies suﬀer much more severe falls in investment and private consumption, and take
longer to recover. They point to the importance of ﬁnancial frictions channel. Using ﬁfteen
emerging market economies data, Bhattarai et al. (2016) show that an unanticipated rise in
US stock market uncertainty has negative eﬀects on their stock prices and exchange rate,
and leads to capital outﬂows. Moreover, they ﬁnd clear heterogeneity between South Amer-
ican countries and the rest of emerging market economies. This heterogeneity can be related
to diﬀerential monetary policy reaction by these two groups of countries. However, little is
known about the diﬀerential impact of uncertainty shocks on unemployment. Our originality
lies in investigating cross-country heterogeneity in terms of labor market responses.
This work also contributes to a recent body of literature that investigates the role of
LMIs for business cycle ﬂuctuations. Much of the existing analysis of LMIs have focused
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on the impact on the underlying structural features of the economy3, but only a few papers
have studied their impact on business cycle ﬂuctuations. In theory, stricter EPL reduces un-
employment volatility as suggested by the search and matching models of Thomas & Zanetti
(2009) and Zanetti (2011). On the other hand, little consensus emerges from empirical stud-
ies. Some studies ﬁnd no eﬀect on output volatility (Rumler & Scharler (2011)), while others
ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on unemployment or output volatility (Merkl & Schmitz (2011)) or an
inverted U-shaped eﬀect on the relative unemployment to output volatility (Lochner (2014)).
The available evidence is also inconclusive in the case of unemployment beneﬁt or unions.
However, none has considered uncertainty shocks for the impact of LMIs on business cycle
dynamics. This paper ﬁlls this gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the data and the empirical
strategy. Section 3 presents the main results and economic mechanisms. Section 4 conducts
a number of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data and Empirical methodology
In this section, I explain the data for empirical analysis as well as the methodology I adopt.
3.2.1 Data
The economic literature oﬀers various methods for proxying the unobservable level of uncer-
tainty: ﬁnancial market indicators, news-based measure, survey-based measure, and forecast
errors. There is no single general indicator of uncertainty, as such indicator has its advan-
tages and pitfalls. The availability of indicators at country level represents an important
constraints in the OECD context. Therefore, our baseline measure of uncertainty is stock
market volatility, which is one of the most widely used measures in the literature (See Bloom
(2014)). Implied volatility derived from equity options, however, are not available for many
countries or over the long samples. I thus resort to realized volatility. Fortunately though,
implied and realized equity volatilities are highly correlated4.
On the other hand, in measuring uncertainty for a panel of countries, it is debatable
whether the relevant measure is a local indicator, or a common global measure. Gourio
et al. (2013) show that country-level risk measures constructed using local realized equity
3See the survey by Mortensen & Pissarides (1999)
4For US, they are correlated at 0.874 (1996-2015)
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volatilities contain a large common component across OECD countries: the ﬁrst principle
component accounts for more than 40% of total variance in a large set of 27 OECD countries
over 40 years. Moreover, they use the mean of country-level indices as a measure of global
risk. Carriére-Swallow & Cépedes (2013) use the Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 100
Volatility (VXO) index, to identify global shocks, given that it is debatable to what extent
ﬁnancial market series are a proper measure of local business condition in an emerging
economy. In this paper, I use both local and global measures. In a benchmark model, I
choose to use a local stock market volatility to take into account country-speciﬁc variations
in uncertainty. Moreover, I test whether the results are robust to using VXO index as a
common measure of global uncertainty.
Figure 3.1 shows the local uncertainty series for G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan,
UK, and US) and identiﬁed global uncertainty shocks5. Realized equity volatility series
contain a common component across countries: they tend to coincide around the most
pronounced peaks (which are identiﬁed as global shocks), such as the period of Russian &
LTCM default in 1998, WorldCom & Enron and Gulf War in 2002-2003, the global ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008-2009, and the euro area debt crisis in 2012. On the other hand, there are other
periods, where some local crises are not identiﬁed as a global shock, such as the Asian crisis
in 1997 and the dot-com bubble burst in 2001.
I use 30 OECD countries data6 at the quarterly frequency for the period from 1996Q1 to
2015Q4. I import daily MSCI equity returns for the sample countries and build quarterly
series of stock market volatility by computing standard deviations over calendar quarters.
Unemployment rate and GDP data come from the OECD. Appendix 3.5 provides a detailed
data description.
3.2.2 VAR speciﬁcation
I analyze the eﬀect of changes in uncertainty on unemployment rate and GDP. Speciﬁcally,
to identify the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks, I estimate country-speciﬁc VARs linking stock
prices, unemployment rates, and real GDP. To do this, the dynamics of the vector Yt =
5Following Bloom (2009), they are identiﬁed as periods in which the HP de-trended VXO index exceeds
its mean by more than 1.65 standard deviations.
6They include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
I exclude 5 countries (Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia) from OECD member countries,
in which he has GDP less than 100 billion US dollars.
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Figure 3.1: Uncertainty measures
Note: Shaded areas indicates global uncertainty shocks, identiﬁed in periods of Russian & LTCM default in
1998, WorldCom & Enron and Gulf War in 2002-2003, the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008-2009, and the euro
area debt crisis in 2012. Following Bloom (2009), they are identiﬁed as periods in which the HP de-trended
VXO index exceeds its mean by more than 1.65 standard deviations.
[spt, volt, ut, gdpt] takes the following functional form:
Equity return
Uncertainty measure
Unemployment rate
real GDP

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yt
= B0 +B1Yt−1 + ...BpYt−p + A0εt (3.1)
The spt variable is log of equity return, which is proxied by MSCI, volt is uncertainty
measure, ut is log of unemployment rate, and gdpt is log of real GDP. This Cholesky ordering
assumes that shocks instantaneously inﬂuence the stock market (levels and volatility), then
real economic outcome (unemployment and output). For robustness, I also tested other
orderings, which did not materially alter the impulse response functions. Including equity
return as the ﬁrst variable in the VAR is a conservative choice to control for ﬁrst-moment
shocks to returns as in Carriére-Swallow & Cépedes (2013)7. All variables are seasonally
7Uncertainty measures tend to rise in recessions and fall in booms. It is possible that uncertainty may
reﬂect bad economic times rather than an uncertain future. Then, I include equity returns as an additional
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adjusted, and detrended using the HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1600. Two lags of
each variables are included according to Akaike's information criterion. The magnitude of
the orthogonalized shock to uncertainty is one standard deviation.
I estimate the model separately for each of the countries. I can then classify countries into
groups based on their structural characteristics and explore the cross-sectional dimension by
comparing diﬀerences across country groups.
3.3 Estimation results
3.3.1 Main ﬁndings
Our interest lies in the estimated responses of the domestic variables to the uncertainty
shock. Figure 3.2 plots the median and the interquartile range of individual country impulse
responses to a one-standard deviation shock to our measure of uncertainty for 30 OECD
countries.
These results provide a ﬁrst glimpse of the heterogeneity of the responses. While there
is meaningful heterogeneity of unemployment responses to uncertainty shocks, a rise in
uncertainty has signiﬁcant eﬀects on unemployment, averaging about 0.5 percent over the
ﬁrst 2 quarters, and fading away. As expected, in most countries, GDP decreases in response
to a uncertainty shock. These results are consistent with existing empirical literature, which
shows that high uncertainty leads to a contractionary eﬀects on the economy. In Appendix
3.5, I report the impulse response functions country by country.
3.3.2 Candidate explanatory channels
The signiﬁcant cross-section variation in unemployment responses potentially provides us
with the evidence needed to look at the candidate explanatory channels. A number of
potential channels are available to account for the heterogeneity in responses: labor market
institutions, ﬁnancial frictions, and regulatory framework.
Labor market institutions The large body of theoretical discussion about the eﬀects of
uncertainty focuses on "real options eﬀects" following Bernanke (1983). The option value of
variable to control for potential eﬀects from changes in equity returns
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Figure 3.2: The impulse responses to an uncertainty shock
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Note: The ﬁgure reports the cross-section variation of responses for diﬀerent countries, with the median
(solid line) and inter-quartile range (dotted line), to a one standard deviation shock to the uncertainty
variable.
delay is high when uncertainty is high. Therefore, uncertainty makes ﬁrms cautions about
decisions on investment and hiring, which adjustment costs can make expensive to reverse.
Labor adjustment entails non-convex costs8, which are determined in part by LMIs.
When we look at ﬁrm's decision in the labor market, hiring is likely to involve several sunk
costs: job advertising, compensation of applicants, and training of newly hired employees. In
addition, employment contracts are usually long-term relationships. With high uncertainty,
the option value of waiting increases and ﬁrms should delay hirings. Leduc & Liu (2016)
shows that in a search and matching model, vacancy posting is subject to real option eﬀects
with heightened uncertainty. On the other hand, separations should be also subject to an
option value because it entails several sunk costs: procedural inconvenience, notice and
severance pay, and diﬃculty of dismissal. Therefore, high uncertainty induces a drop in the
number of layoﬀs. In a search and matching model with endogenous job separation, Schaal
(2017) shows that separation is also subject to real option eﬀects.
Empirical studies also show clearly that labor adjustments have ﬁxed costs, in particular,
with regard to separation. Abowd & Kramarz (2003) estimate hiring and ﬁring costs, using
8These are ﬁxed costs and partial irreversibility, then generate real options eﬀects
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a cross-sectional matched employer-employee data for France. They ﬁnd that separation
costs include a very large ﬁxed component whereas hiring costs are much lower. Kramarz
& Michaud (2010) estimate the functional form of hiring and ﬁring costs using French data.
They ﬁnd that collective terminations entail very large ﬁxed costs whereas hiring costs are
small, with a negligible ﬁxed component.
Let us look at the transmission of uncertainty shocks in the labor market. When uncer-
tainty hits the economy, the drops in real activity reduce labor demand. Firms should adjust
their workforce by hiring less and ﬁring more. In theory, ﬁring costs reduce job destruction
during downturns. When ﬁring costs are higher, ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier and cheaper to absorb
shocks by keeping workers. Instead, ﬁrms might adjust prices and wages. This mechanism is
also in line with the ﬁrst moment shock. Thomas & Zanetti (2009) and Zanetti (2011) ﬁnd
in a search and matching model that higher ﬁring costs dampen the employment adjustment
with the ﬁrst moment shock. However, the second moment shocks reinforces this mechanism
through the real options channel: in periods of high uncertainty, ﬁring costs which have
larger ﬁxed component come with a bigger cost, as it would be costly to hire new work-
ers when productivity reverts quickly. Under irreversibility and uncertainty, ﬁrms become
more reluctant to lay workers oﬀ and separation margin is more important on business cycle
ﬂuctuations.
Hence, EPL, which is closely related to ﬁxed costs of ﬁring, might be a key parameter to
explaining the heterogenous responses in unemployment to an uncertainty shock. We expect
that high EPL (high ﬁring cost) might increase the option value of waiting, induce lower
separations, and alleviate the rise in unemployment.
Financial frictions A plausible explanation that could account for the heterogeneity in
responses across countries is the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. As the economy enters a
period of high uncertainty, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to obtain ﬁnancing for their
projects if (i) banks ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to gauge the degree of risk involved in the project,
(ii) banks are unable to obtain external ﬁnancing themselves due to a shortage of liquidity or
ﬂight-to-quality episode, or (iii) ﬁrms suﬀer a deterioration of their balance sheets (perhaps
due to a currency mismatch and sudden depreciation) which reduces the collateral available
to post against new loans. The fall in the collateral value and/or the deterioration in the
ﬁrms' balance sheets increase the negative eﬀect of the uncertainty shock in the economy
both in terms of the initial fall but also in terms of the persistence of the drop in investment.
As a result, the decrease in investment might lead to the fall in labor demand and output.
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Carriére-Swallow & Cépedes (2013) explore the link between the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks
and the functioning of ﬁnancial markets. They show that economies with less-developed
ﬁnancial markets suﬀer more in terms of investment. We expect that the depths of local
ﬁnancial sector are inversely associated with the responses of unemployment.
Regulatory framework Product market ﬂexibility is determined by the quality of busi-
ness regulation and the degree of competition, which are likely to vary across countries. This
regulatory framework might help describe the heterogeneity in the unemployment responses.
Countries with regulatory frameworks that make investments or ﬁrm entry less irreversible
should thus generate larger real-option values to waiting during the period of heightened
uncertainty, and thus leads to a severe fall in real activity, then labor demand. We expect
that there is a positive correlation between regulatory framework and the unemployment
responses.
3.3.3 Which channel is more important?
In order to examine the diﬀerences in reactions across countries, I compute for each country
the amplitude of impulse response function for unemployment rate, deﬁned as the biggest
value in the country's IRF. Moreover, I compute the correlations between the amplitudes
of impulse responses and relevant country characteristics across 30 OECD countries. As
proxies for labor market institutions, I use EPL9, unemployment beneﬁt (net replacement
rates), minimum wage (relative to average wages of full-time workers), bargaining coverage
(the ratio of employees covered by collective agreements, divided by all wage earners with
right to bargaining), and trade union density (the ratio of union members divided by the
total number of employees) by OECD. Among them, I view EPL as a useful measure of the
ﬁring costs. I also consider GDP per capita and ﬁnancial depth, deﬁned as private credit by
deposit money banks to GDP (%), which are from World Bank. Financial depth is generally
interpreted as a proxy for ﬁnancial constraints. Indicators of product market regulation
comes from the OECD10. I view this index as product market constraint or the degree of
irreversibility in an economy.
9The OECD indicators of employment protection legislation measure the procedures
and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures
involved in hiring workers on ﬁxed-term or temporary work agency contracts. See
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
10See http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/indicatorsofproductmarketregulationhomepage.htm#Sources
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Table 3.1: Correlations between response function amplitudes and country characteristics
Correlation
Labor market institutions
Employment protection legislation -0.43***
Unemployment beneﬁt -0.14
Minimum wage -0.08
Bargaining coverage -0.34*
Trade union density 0.00
Others
GDP per capita -0.34*
Financial depth -0.19
Product market regulation 0.10
Notes: (i) Amplitude is deﬁned as the biggest value in
the country's IRF for the ﬁrst 8 quarters. (ii) variables
correspond to average value during 2008∼2013. (iii) *,
**, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1%,
respectively.
Figure 3.3: Response function amplitudes of unemployment rates and country characteristics
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Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3 shows the correlations and scatter plots between the amplitudes
of unemployment responses and structural characteristics of sample countries. The values
of correlation coeﬃcient have the expected signs as discussed in the previous section, even
though some of them are not signiﬁcant. When we ﬁrst look at employment protection
legislation, EPL is negatively correlated with the amplitude of the response in unemploy-
ment in a signiﬁcant way. As discussed above, high EPL countries suﬀer more severe rise
in unemployment rate. Bargaining coverage is also inversely associated with the response
of unemployment. The role of other labor market characteristics such as unemployment
beneﬁt, minimum wage, and trade union density is ambiguous. When it comes to GDP
per capita and ﬁnancial depth, they are negatively correlated with the amplitude of the
response in GDP. This ﬁnding echoes the results of Carriére-Swallow & Cépedes (2013).
Emerging countries with less-developed ﬁnancial markets suﬀer more with heightened un-
certainty than advanced countries do. However, the role of ﬁnancial depth is not signiﬁcant.
Moreover, product market regulation is positively associated with unemployment responses.
With high uncertainty, regulation can come with a bigger cost and discourage entrepreneurs,
leading to lower labor demand. Therefore, heavily regulated countries suﬀer more with high
uncertainty. However, the eﬀect of product market regulation is also not signifcant.
3.3.4 Subgroup analysis
I can estimate average eﬀects (Figure 3.2) using all the countries in the sample as well as
those pertaining to the sub-groups of countries. This latter aspect of empirical exercises led
us to explore the cross-sectional dimension and study the role of EPL in the transmission
of uncertainty shocks. To do so, I split the OECD countries by EPL. Figure 3.4 represents
EPL measures of 30 OECD countries. I construct a subpanel of Member states having lower
EPL (six countries with the lowest EPL11) versus a subpanel of Member states with higher
EPL (six countries with the highest EPL12).
Figure 3.5 reports the weighted average of impulse responses to a one standard deviation
shock to uncertainty variable with 68 percent error bands for each of two groups (low EPL
vs. high EPL). Weights are inversely proportional to the standard deviation of each impulse
response. The impact of an uncertainty shock visibly diﬀers between the two groups. Follow-
ing an uncertainty shock, countries with low EPL suﬀer more severe rise in unemployment
11Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Netherland, Germany, and France (from lowest level)
12New Zeland, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Chile, and Australia (from highest level)
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Figure 3.4: EPL for OECD countries
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Figure 3.5: The weighted average of impulse responses of unemployment rates to a local
uncertainty shock
Note: This ﬁgure plots the weighted average of individual impulse responses. Weights are inversely pro-
portional to the standard deviation of each impulse response. Shaded areas present the 68 percent error
bands.
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and take longer to recover to their pre-shock trend. On the other hand, high EPL countries
do not present a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
These results generalize the ﬁndings of Gourio et al. (2013) and Bachmann et al. (2013)
with 30 OECD countries. Gourio et al. (2013) investigate a group of G7 countries: low
EPL countries (Canada, Japan, UK, and US) suﬀer higher rise in unemployment rate than
high EPL countries (France, Germany, and Italy) do. Bachmann et al. (2013) ﬁnd that
the response to a surprise increase in uncertainty in the US is quite diﬀerent from the one
in Germany: in the US, high uncertainty has larger and much more persistent eﬀects on
production and employment.
3.4 Robustness checks
In this section, I conduct a series of robustness exercises.
First of all, I replace local measures (individual country's equity return and realized equity
volatility) with global measures (S&P 500 and VXO Index) in the VAR. I consider VXO as
a common measure of global uncertainty. Figure 3.6 reports the weighted average of impulse
responses to a one standard deviation shock to global uncertainty variable. The results
are similar to those with local uncertainty measures. Importantly, there is no evidence of
over-adjustment in low EPL countries when economies recover from the shocks, whereas the
short-lived increase in unemployment in high EPL countries is subsequently compensated
for. This similar evidence suggests that OECD countries suﬀer from both idiosyncratic
and common uncertainty shocks, reﬂecting the high degree of interconnectedness of their
economies.
In the baseline speciﬁcation, I put equity return before uncertainty measures in the VARs.
In this exercise, I remove equity return, then uncertainty comes ﬁrst in the three variable
VARs. Figure 3.7 presents the weighted average of impulse responses of three variable VARs.
The eﬀects of an uncertainty shock are bigger than those in the benchmark, and the diﬀerence
between two groups is more signiﬁcant.
Moreover, I construct another two subgroups by EPL. In this exercise, each subpanel has
ten sample countries as a conservative choice.13 Figure 3.8 shows the weighted average of
13ten countries with the lowest EPL (Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Netherland, Germany, France, Czech
Republic, Mexico, Greece, and Spain (from lowest level)) versus ten countries with the highest EPL (New
Zeland, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Chile, Australia, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, and Finland
(from highest level))
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Figure 3.6: The weighted average of impulse responses of unemployment rates to a global
uncertainty shock
Note: This ﬁgure plots the weighted average of individual impulse responses. Weights are inversely pro-
portional to the standard deviation of each impulse response. Shaded areas present the 68 percent error
bands.
Figure 3.7: The weighted average of impulse responses of unemployment rates to a local
uncertainty shock (three variable VAR)
Note: This ﬁgure plots the weighted average of individual impulse responses. Shaded areas present the 68
percent error bands.
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Figure 3.8: The weighted average of impulse responses of unemployment rates to a local
uncertainty shock (each panel has 10 sample countries)
Note: This ﬁgure plots the weighted average of individual impulse responses. Shaded areas present the 68
percent error bands.
impulse responses with new subgropus. While the error bands are rather wide as expected,
the results between two groups are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
In the baseline exercise, impulse responses of each group are the weighted average of the
point estimates. I conduct an additional exercise with median impulse responses of each
group. The median IRF in step i is deﬁned as the median across all IRFs in step i as in
Carriére-Swallow & Cépedes (2013). Figure 3.9 reports the median impulse response to a one
standard deviation shock to a local uncertainty variable. Results remain roughly unchanged.
3.5 Conclusion
The eﬀects of uncertainty shocks can vary across countries, depending on their structural
characteristics, policy reactions, etc. This paper tries to focus on the role of LMIs in the
transmission of uncertainty shocks. Using country-speciﬁc VARs, I show that there is sub-
stantial cross-country heterogeneity on the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks. Exploring the
cross-sectional dimension, I also provide evidence that EPL, which is closely associated with
ﬁxed cost of ﬁring, is a key parameter to explaining the heterogeneous responses in unem-
ployment rates. Stricter EPL mutes the reaction of unemployment, making it more costly
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Figure 3.9: The median impulse response of unemployment rates to a local uncertainty shock
Note: This ﬁgure plots the median impulse responses. The median IRF in step i is deﬁned as the median
across all IRFs in step i. Shaded areas present the 68 percent error bands.
to lay workers oﬀ. Moreover, the second moment shock reinforces this mechanism through
the real options channel. Under irreversibility and uncertainty, ﬁrms become more reluctant
to lay workers oﬀ. The role of other country characteristics is ambiguous.
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Appendix
A Data
• Macroeconomic series (unemployment rate and real GDP) come from the quarterly
database of the OECD. Sample window starts in 1996q1 and ends in 2015q4.
• Stock market series come from the monthly database of MSCI and Bloomberg.
• OECD indicators of employment protection legislation
• GDP per capita (average value during 2008 2010) are from World Bank.
• Financial depth (average value during 2008 2010), deﬁned as private credit by deposit
money banks to GDP (%), are from World Bank.
• OECD indicators of product market regulation
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B Impulse responses of unemployment rate (country by country)
Figure 3.10: Impulse responses of unemployment rate across countries
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Quarters
%
 c
ha
ng
e
 
 
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Quarters
 
 
Czech
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Quarters
 
 
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Italy
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Quarters
%
 c
ha
ng
e
 
 
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherland
Newzeland
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Quarters
 
 
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak
Spain
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Quarters
 
 
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
US
108
C Country names and symbols
Table 3.2: Country names and symbols
Country name Symbol Country name Symbol
Australia AUS Japan JPN
Austria AUT Korea KOR
Belgium BEL Mexico MEX
Canada CAN Netherland NLD
Chile CHL New Zeland NZL
Czech Republic CZE Norway NOR
Denmark DNK Poland POL
Finland FIN Portugal PRT
France FRA Slovak Republic SVK
Germany DEU Spain ESP
Greece GRC Sweden SWE
Hungary HUN Switzerland CHE
Ireland IRL Turkey TUR
Israel ISR United Kingdom GBR
Italy ITA United States USA
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